Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court, in any cause or matter pending before it, to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice, and makes that order enforceable throughout India. The power is wide enough to step past procedural rules and even ordinary statutory limits, but it cannot be used to override fundamental rights, to ignore a statute that expressly governs the subject, or to supplant an express provision of the Constitution. Most exam questions on Article 142 sit on that boundary, and the cases from Prem Chand Garg (1962) to the 2025 Presidential Reference on Governors' assent mark where it runs.
What does Article 142 actually say?
Article 142 has two clauses with quite different jobs. Clause (1) is the "complete justice" power: an order or decree necessary for complete justice in a pending cause or matter, enforceable across India in the manner Parliament prescribes by law, and until then in the manner the President prescribes by order. The order currently in force is the Supreme Court (Decrees and Orders) Enforcement Order, 1954.
Clause (2) gives the Court power, subject to any law made by Parliament, to secure the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of documents, and the investigation or punishment of contempt of itself. Contempt is also covered by Article 129, which makes the Supreme Court a court of record, and the two Articles are usually cited together.
Three features of clause (1) carry most of the weight in answers:
- Pending matter. The power is exercised in a cause or matter already before the Court. It is not a free-standing jurisdiction that a person can invoke by filing a petition "under Article 142".
- Necessity. The order must be necessary for complete justice, which ties it to the case in hand and makes it remedial in character.
- Nationwide reach. Unlike a High Court's writ, which runs within its territorial jurisdiction, an Article 142 order is enforceable throughout the territory of India.
How wide is the power to do complete justice?
Wider than any statutory power, because ordinary law does not, by itself, limit it. The leading statement is in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991), the review of the Bhopal gas leak settlement. The Court had recorded a US $470 million settlement in appeals against an interlocutory order, withdrawn the suits and quashed the criminal proceedings. Challenged on jurisdiction, the five-judge bench upheld the power to do so under Article 142(1).
Venkatachaliah J. put it in two sentences that examiners like to quote. A proposition that any ordinary law, whatever the public policy behind it, limits the Court's powers under Article 142(1) is "unsound and erroneous". And "prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142". The power to quash criminal proceedings, the Court said, is not exhausted by the specific provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Union Carbide is not a licence for anything, though. The same judgment said that prohibitions based on fundamental public policy go to what "complete justice" requires in the case, and on the facts it revived the quashed criminal prosecutions. The width of the jurisdiction and the propriety of its use are separate questions.
Another illustration students meet often: in the Ayodhya title judgment of 2019 (M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das), the Constitution Bench used Article 142 to direct that five acres of suitable land be allotted to the Sunni Central Waqf Board for building a mosque.
What limits did Prem Chand Garg and the Bar Association case set?
The two classic limits are that Article 142 cannot override fundamental rights and cannot be used to ignore a statute that deals with the subject.
Prem Chand Garg (1962)
In Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., the Court struck down a Supreme Court rule that let it demand security for the respondent's costs before entertaining an Article 32 petition. Gajendragadkar J., for the majority of four, held that an order to do complete justice "must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws". Shah J. dissented on the validity of the rule.
Union Carbide later treated the second half of that statement, about statutory law, as unnecessary to the decision in Garg, because Garg concerned a fundamental right. The first half, that Article 142 cannot be used against Part III, has never been doubted.
Supreme Court Bar Association (1998)
In In re Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995), a three-judge bench convicted an advocate of contempt and, relying on Articles 129 and 142, also suspended him from practice for three years. In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench overruled that part. The power to suspend or remove an advocate for professional misconduct lies with the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961; the courts hold the contempt power. The two do not merge.
The passage every student should know: Article 142 is "curative in nature", it cannot be used to "supplant" substantive law, and "even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly".
How did Shilpa Sailesh restate the test in 2023?
Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, decided by a Constitution Bench on 1 May 2023, reconciled the earlier cases and is now the starting point for any answer. The Court held that under Article 142(1) it can depart from procedural and substantive law, provided it acts on considerations of fundamental general and specific public policy. It must consider the substantive provisions and not ignore them. Reading Union Carbide and the Bar Association case together, it said the power is barred only where the order would be "plainly and expressly barred by statutory provisions of substantive law based on fundamental considerations of general or specific public policy".
Applying that test, the Court held:
- On a settlement between spouses, it may grant divorce by mutual consent without insisting on the six-month period and second motion under section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, guided by the factors in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017).
- It may quash connected proceedings, including criminal cases, where the conditions laid down in decided cases are met.
- It may dissolve a marriage that has irretrievably broken down even if one spouse opposes, though such a divorce is not a matter of right and the breakdown must be factually established.
- A party cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 or 226 asking for divorce on that ground.
The fourth point is easy to miss and is exactly the kind of statement that appears in prelims. Irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act, and the only route to it is the Supreme Court's own discretion in a matter already before it. For the ordinary procedure under section 13-B that most couples follow, the mutual divorce procedure guide explains the steps in plain language.
Can Article 142 be used to fill a gap in the law?
Yes, with a condition: directions issued to fill a legislative vacuum operate only until the legislature or executive steps in. Vishaka (1997), which laid down binding guidelines on sexual harassment at the workplace under Article 32, is the best-known example, and the method was carried forward in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1997). There the Court struck down the "Single Directive" requiring prior sanction before the CBI inquired into senior officers, and under Article 32 read with Article 142 issued directions on the CVC, the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate. It held that such directions have the force of law under Article 141 and bind all authorities under Article 144 until legislation replaces them.
Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) followed the same method. Having recognised passive euthanasia and advance medical directives under Article 21, the Constitution Bench laid down detailed procedural guidelines expressly under Article 142, to operate until Parliament legislates.
| Case | Year | What it adds on Article 142 |
|---|---|---|
| Prem Chand Garg | 1962 | Cannot be used against fundamental rights |
| Union Carbide | 1991 | Ordinary statutes do not by themselves limit the power |
| Supreme Court Bar Association | 1998 | Cannot supplant substantive law or ignore an express statute on the subject |
| Vineet Narain | 1997 | Directions filling a vacuum bind under Articles 141 and 144 until legislation |
| Common Cause | 2018 | Guidelines on advance directives issued under Article 142 |
| Shilpa Sailesh | 2023 | Test of fundamental public policy; divorce on irretrievable breakdown |
| HCBA Allahabad | 2024 | Cannot defeat natural justice or rights of non-parties |
| Gayatri Balasamy | 2025 | Use with great care in arbitration; no rewriting of awards on merits |
| Special Reference No. 1 of 2025 | 2025 | No "deemed assent"; cannot override express constitutional provisions |
Where has the Court drawn the line recently?
The recent decisions keep the power wide while insisting on fairness and the constitutional text.
HCBA Allahabad (2024)
In Asian Resurfacing (2018), a three-judge bench had directed that wherever proceedings in a pending civil or criminal trial stood stayed, the stay would lapse automatically after six months unless extended by a speaking order. A Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. (29 February 2024) held that such a blanket direction cannot be issued under Article 142. Oka J. listed parameters: the power is to do complete justice between the parties before the Court and cannot nullify benefits that many non-parties hold under valid judicial orders; it does not permit the Court to ignore litigants' substantive rights; procedural directions are permissible, but the right to be heard is substantive; and it cannot defeat the principles of natural justice.
Gayatri Balasamy (2025)
In Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, on modification of arbitral awards, the Constitution Bench said Article 142 should be used with great care and consistently with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It should not be used to rewrite an award or modify it on merits, though it may be used where necessary to bring the dispute to an end.
Governors, Bills and "deemed assent" (2025)
In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (8 April 2025), a two-judge bench held the Governor's reservation of ten re-passed Bills illegal and, invoking Article 142, declared them deemed to have received assent. The President then sought the Court's opinion under Article 143. In its opinion of 20 November 2025 in Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, a five-judge bench said that deemed assent by the Court under Article 142 is "virtually a takeover of the role, and function, of a separate constitutional authority", that Article 142 "cannot be employed to arrive at a conclusion contrary to the express provisions of the Constitution", and that the Constitution, Article 142 included, does not allow for deemed assent of Bills. It also declined to prescribe judicial timelines for the Governor and the President. Recent developments of this kind are tracked in the legalfirms.in judgments index.
How is Article 142 asked in judiciary exams?
Prelims papers ask which statement about Article 142 is correct; mains papers set a problem and ask whether the Supreme Court can grant a particular relief.
Scenario one. Suppose a husband and wife have lived apart for nine years, a settlement fails, and the wife opposes divorce. Their transfer petition is pending in the Supreme Court. Under Shilpa Sailesh, the Court may dissolve the marriage on irretrievable breakdown, weighing the length of separation, the litigation between them and provision for the wife. A High Court hearing a writ petition could not.
Scenario two. Suppose, while punishing an advocate for contempt, the Supreme Court also bars her from practice in all courts for two years. Following the Bar Association case, the suspension is beyond Article 142; the Court may refer the matter to the Bar Council, and it may refuse to hear the contemnor until the contempt is purged.
Scenario three. Suppose the Court, in one appeal, directs that every interim stay granted by any High Court in property suits will lapse after a year. After HCBA Allahabad, the direction is vulnerable because it affects thousands of litigants who were never heard.
Common mistakes:
- Calling Article 142 an original jurisdiction that can be invoked by a separate petition.
- Citing Prem Chand Garg's statutory-law observation as the current test, without Union Carbide and Shilpa Sailesh.
- Saying High Courts have an equivalent power under Article 226. The "complete justice" power in Article 142 belongs to the Supreme Court alone.
- Treating the deemed assent in the Tamil Nadu case as settled law after the November 2025 opinion.
Key points to remember
- Article 142(1): complete justice in a pending cause or matter, enforceable throughout India.
- Article 142(2): attendance, documents and contempt, subject to parliamentary law; read with Article 129.
- Cannot override fundamental rights (Prem Chand Garg) or ignore an express statute on the subject (Supreme Court Bar Association).
- Ordinary law does not, ipso facto, limit the power (Union Carbide); barred only where an order is plainly and expressly barred by substantive statute (Shilpa Sailesh).
- Gap-filling directions bind under Articles 141 and 144 until legislation (Vineet Narain, Common Cause).
- Cannot be used against natural justice or non-parties' rights (HCBA Allahabad, 2024).
- Cannot supplant the Constitution's express provisions; no deemed assent (Special Reference No. 1 of 2025).
Where to go next
Read the Union Carbide and Supreme Court Bar Association digests one after the other, because the second explains the first, and then Shilpa Sailesh for the current synthesis. Test the distinctions on the constitutional law mock tests, where Article 142 statements appear alongside questions on Articles 32, 136 and 141.