Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India

Supreme Court of India, 22 December 1989, 5 judges, 1990 AIR 1480; 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 597; 1990 SCC (1) 613

The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, making the Central Government the sole representative of the victims, was upheld; Mukharji, CJ and Singh, J. read it as obliging the Government to pay interim relief.

Facts

On the night of 2 December 1984 lethal gas escaped from the MIC storage tank at the Bhopal plant of Union Carbide (India) Ltd., a subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation, causing large scale death and injury. Parliament enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, under which the Central Government took the exclusive right to represent and act for the victims in claims, including in the American courts, and to settle them. A settlement with the companies was recorded by the Supreme Court in February 1989. Victims and others challenged the Act under Articles 14, 19 and 21 by writ petitions under Article 32, arguing it divested victims of their right to sue, created a conflict of interest, and allowed settlement without hearing them.

Questions before the Court

Is the Act, which substitutes the Central Government for the victims in pursuing their claims, valid under Articles 14, 19 and 21?
Could the Central Government act for the victims despite an alleged conflict of interest, and does the doctrine of parens patriae support the Act?
Does the Act require the Central Government to pay interim relief, and were the victims entitled to notice before a settlement under Section 4?

What the Court held

All the judges held the Act constitutionally valid. Given the victims' plight, the urgency of their needs and the strength of the multinational adversary, divesting them of the right to sue and vesting it in the Central Government was not unreasonable.
Per Mukharji, CJ (with whom Singh, J. agreed): the victims were in a sense disabled against their adversaries, so the State could act as parent to protect them; even if parens patriae did not strictly apply, the Act itself conferred the authority. Ranganathan, J. described the State's role as somewhat analogous to parens patriae.
Per Mukharji, CJ: there was no real conflict of interest, since the Central Government itself held no shares in UCIL, was the only body able to represent the victims, and was advancing their claims, not judging them.
Mukharji, CJ and Singh, J. held the Act valid only if read as obliging the Central Government to pay interim relief or maintenance until the claims are realised. Ranganathan, J. disagreed: the State's duty to give interim relief flows from its character as a welfare State, and the Act's validity does not depend on it.
Mukharji, CJ held that under Section 4 the victims' views had to be considered and notice given before settlement, but no post-decisional hearing was needed on these facts. Ranganathan, J. held that Section 4 adequately safeguarded the victims and left the validity of the settlement to the pending review.

Why it matters

The judgment upholds legislation that lets the State take over and prosecute mass tort claims on behalf of disabled victims, adapting the parens patriae concept to the Bhopal disaster. The leading judgment reads into the Act a duty to pay interim relief and insists on hearing victims before settlement, and the opinions call on the Government to frame safety norms and funds for hazardous industries and multinational corporations.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“In that perspective, it is jurisprudentially possible to apply the principle of parens patriae doctrine to the victims. But quite apart from that, it has to be borne in mind that in this case the State is acting on the basis of the Statute itself. For the authority of the Central Govt. to sue for and on behalf of or instead in place of the victims, no other theory, concept or any jurisprudential principle is required than the Act itself.”

Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJPage 69 of the judgment

“In that background, it is just and proper that this deprivation is only to be justified if the Act is read with the obligation of granting interim relief or maintenance by the Central Government until the full amount of the dues of the victims is realised from the Union Carbide after adjudication or settlement and then deducting therefrom the interim relief paid to the victims.”

Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJPage 70 of the judgment

“In the premise, we hold that the Act is constitutionally valid in the manner we read it. It proceeds on the hypothesis that until the claims of the victims are realised or obtained. from the delinquents, namely, UCC and UCIL by settlement or by adjudication and until the proceedings in respect thereof continue the Central Government must pay interim compensation or maintenance for the victims.”

Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJPage 83 of the judgment

“Though we would emphatically reiterate that grant of interim relief to ameliorate the plight of its subjects in such a situation is a matter of imperative obligation on the part of the State and not merely 'a matter of fundamental human decency' as Judge Keenan put it, we think that such obligation flows from its character as a welfare State and would exist irrespective of what the statute may or may not provide.”

Ranganathan, J.Page 98 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Sections 3, 4, 9 and 10, Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985
Article 14, Constitution
Article 19, Constitution
Article 21, Constitution

Case and bench

Parties: Charan Lal Sahu etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors.
Case: Writ Petition No. 268 of 1989 etc. etc.
Decided: 22 December 1989
Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (CJ), Singh, K.N., Ranganathan, S., Ahmadi, A.M., Saikia, K.N.
Opinions: All five judges agreed with the order proposed by Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJ, who wrote the leading judgment; K.N. Singh, J. agreed with it and added his own opinion. Ranganathan, J. wrote a separate opinion in the plural ('we'), agreeing in large measure but not with the Chief Justice's view that the Act's validity depends on an obligation to pay interim relief. The judgment text does not say which opinion Saikia, J. and Ahmadi, J. joined.

Questions on this case

4 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:

Question 1, Environmental Law Practice Set 1
In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (1989), the Supreme Court upheld the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, under which the Central Government represented the victims of the gas leak in their claims. The doctrine relied upon to justify the State acting on behalf of the victims was:
1. A. the doctrine of parens patriae
2. B. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
3. C. the doctrine of eminent domain of the State
4. D. the doctrine of public trust over natural resources
Show the answer
A. the doctrine of parens patriae
The Court held the Act constitutionally valid and explained the parens patriae doctrine as the obligation of the State to protect and fight for the rights of citizens who are not in a position to assert them, an obligation drawn from the Preamble and Articles 38, 39 and 39A.