Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan
Supreme Court of India, 14 April 1954, 4 judges, 1954 AIR 340; 1955 SCR 117
A decree of an appellate court that lacked pecuniary jurisdiction only because the suit was undervalued is not a nullity; under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act it can be set aside only for prejudice on the merits.
Facts
The appellants sued in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Monghyr, for possession of agricultural land and mesne profits, valuing the suit at Rs. 2,950. The suit was dismissed, and their appeal to the District Court, the proper appellate forum on that valuation, was also dismissed. In second appeal the Stamp Reporter of the Patna High Court objected to the valuation, and the High Court fixed the true value at a higher figure, on which the appeal would have lain to the High Court. The appellants then argued that the District Court's decree was a nullity and that their second appeal should be heard as a first appeal. The High Court held the District Court's appeal competent, found no prejudice on the merits, and dismissed the second appeal. The appellants came to the Supreme Court by special leave.
Questions before the Court
- Is a decree passed by an appellate court that would have lacked jurisdiction on the correct valuation a nullity?
- Is the hearing of the appeal by a lower forum, or an error in findings of fact, 'prejudice' under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act?
- Can a party who chose the forum on his own valuation complain of prejudice?
What the Court held
- As a general principle, a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and its invalidity can be set up wherever it is relied on, even in execution or collateral proceedings; such a defect cannot be cured by consent.
- Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is a self-contained provision: a decree of a court that lacked jurisdiction only because of over-valuation or under-valuation is not null and void, and such objections can be raised only under that section. Its policy matches Sections 21 and 99 CPC.
- A mere change in the forum of appeal is not prejudice under Section 11, and an error in findings of fact is not prejudice either, since it is not caused by the valuation. Prejudice is to be decided on the facts of each case under an equitable jurisdiction.
- A party who resorted to a forum of his own choice on his own valuation cannot complain of prejudice. In any event the District Court gave a full hearing on the merits, so the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Why it matters
The judgment restates the principle that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity whose invalidity can be set up whenever it is relied on, even in execution and collateral proceedings. It then holds that objections to pecuniary jurisdiction based on wrong valuation stand on a different footing: under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, read with the policy of Sections 21 and 99 CPC, such decrees are not void and are interfered with only on proof of prejudice on the merits.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.”
“The policy underlying sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice”
“the party who has resorted to a forum of his own choice on his own valuation cannot himself be heard to complain of any prejudice. Prejudice can be a ground for relief only when it is due to the action of another party and not when it results from one's own act.”
Provisions interpreted
Case and bench
- Parties
- Kiran Singh and Others v. Chaman Paswan and Others
- Case
- Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1953
- Decided
- 14 April 1954
- Bench
- Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama, Mukherjea, B.K., Bose, Vivian, Hasan, Ghulam
- Opinions
- Unanimous. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Venkatarama Ayyar, J.
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