Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi
Supreme Court of India, 6 February 1957, 3 judges, 1957 AIR 425; 1957 SCR 575
A Bar Council tribunal chaired by a lawyer who had appeared for the complainant was improperly constituted, since the test is reasonable apprehension of bias; but the advocate had waived the objection, so his removal from practice was upheld.
Facts
Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi complained that the appellant, an advocate of the Rajasthan High Court, had procured a false stay order from the office of the Sessions Judge, Pali, in favour of his clients in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Chief Justice nominated a three member tribunal under Section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act. Its Chairman had earlier appeared and argued for Dr. Prem Chand in the Section 145 proceedings. The tribunal found the appellant guilty of professional misconduct, and the High Court ordered his removal from practice. In the High Court the appellant objected for the first time to the Chairman's presence. He appealed by special leave.
Questions before the Court
- Was the tribunal improperly constituted because its Chairman had appeared for the complainant in the underlying proceedings, and must actual prejudice be proved?
- Had the appellant waived the objection by not raising it before the tribunal?
- Should the concurrent finding of misconduct and the order of removal be interfered with?
What the Court held
- Every member of a tribunal deciding judicial or quasi-judicial issues must act impartially. Pecuniary interest, however small, disqualifies. Where bias is alleged, the test is not whether bias in fact affected the decision but whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that it might have operated against him.
- The principle applies to a tribunal under the Bar Councils Act even though its report goes to the High Court for final decision. The Chairman's earlier appearance for the complainant was a serious infirmity, and actual proof of prejudice was not necessary.
- Such an objection can be waived, but waiver is inferred only if the party knew the relevant facts and was aware of his right to object. The appellant knew the facts and must be taken to have known his rights; he took a chance on a favourable report, so the objection was barred by waiver.
- There was no ground under Article 136 to disturb the concurrent finding of misconduct. Given the gravity of corrupting court officers and a previous suspension, removal of the appellant's name from the rolls was justified and the appeal was dismissed.
Why it matters
The judgment states the test of bias for judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in India: the question is whether a party could reasonably apprehend bias, because justice must not only be done but must appear to be done. It distinguishes pecuniary interest from other bias, extends the rule to domestic tribunals such as Bar Council tribunals, and explains when the objection is lost by waiver.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“It is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not Whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a, litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal.”
“If it is true that in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings justice must not only be done but must appear to be done to the litigating public, it is equally true that when a lawyer is charged for professional misconduct and is given the privilege of being tried by a tribunal of the Bar Council, the enquiry before the tribunal must leave no room for a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the lawyer that the tribunal may have been even indirectly influenced by any bias in the mind of any of the members of the tribunal.”
“It is true that waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objections Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question.”
Provisions interpreted
- Section 10(2), Bar Councils Act
- Article 136, Constitution
Case and bench
- Parties
- Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand
- Case
- Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1956
- Decided
- 6 February 1957
- Bench
- Gajendragadkar, P.B., Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama, Das, S.K.
- Opinions
- Judgment of the Court delivered by Gajendragadkar, J.
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