Law Maker

R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India

Supreme Court of India, 9 April 1957, 5 judges, 1957 AIR 628; 1957 SCR 930

The Prize Competitions Act, 1955 applies only to competitions of a gambling character, which are not trade protected by Article 19(1)(g); even if it covered skill competitions, its restrictive provisions were severable and valid for gambling competitions.

Facts

On resolutions of several State legislatures under Article 252(1), Parliament enacted the Prize Competitions Act, 1955. Section 2(d) defined prize competition widely as any competition with prizes for solving puzzles built on letters, words or figures. Sections 4 and 5 capped monthly prizes at one thousand rupees and entries at two thousand, and required a licence; Rules 11 and 12 regulated entry fees and registers. Promoters of prize competitions in several States challenged these provisions under Article 32 as unreasonable restrictions on their business. Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Seervai, conceded that on the record the restrictions could not be justified under Article 19(6) for competitions involving substantial skill.

Questions before the Court

  1. Does 'prize competition' in Section 2(d) include competitions in which success depends substantially on skill, or only those of a gambling nature?
  2. If it includes both, are Sections 4 and 5 and Rules 11 and 12 void as a whole, or severable and enforceable against gambling competitions?
  3. Does the doctrine of severability apply where a law is partly void for contravening constitutional prohibitions, and not only for lack of legislative competence?

What the Court held

  • Gambling is not trade but res extra commercium, so promoters of gambling competitions cannot claim the protection of Article 19(1)(g); competitions involving substantial skill are business activities protected by it.
  • Read with the history of the legislation, the Article 252(1) resolutions, the word 'control' in the title and preamble and the mischief addressed, Section 2(d) covers only competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skill.
  • When a statute is partly void, the rest will be enforced if severable. It does not matter whether the invalidity arises from lack of legislative competence or from contravening constitutional prohibitions.
  • The Court set out rules for severability, the test being whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part had it known the rest was invalid. Applying them, the impugned provisions were severable in their application to gambling competitions. The petitions were dismissed with costs.

Why it matters

The judgment states the doctrine of severability for Indian constitutional law in a set of seven rules of construction, centred on legislative intent, and holds that it applies equally to laws that are partly ultra vires for violating fundamental rights. It also uses the history and object of a statute to read down wide general words, and treats gambling as outside the protection of Article 19(1)(g).

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“But even apart from it, having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof and the wording of the statute, we are of opinion that the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skill.”
Venkatarama Aiyar, J.Page 7 of the judgment
“The resulting position may thus be stated: When a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is invalid. It is immaterial for the purpose of this rule whether the invalidity of the statute arises by reason of its subject-matter being outside the competence of the legislature or by reason of its provisions contravening constitutional prohibitions.”
Venkatarama Aiyar, J.Page 14 of the judgment
“In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the invalid parts thereof, it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid.”
Venkatarama Aiyar, J.Page 14 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Related judgments

Case and bench

Parties
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India (with connected petitions)
Case
Writ Petitions Nos. 78-80, 93 and 152 of 1956 (under Article 32)
Decided
9 April 1957
Bench
T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, Sudhi Ranjan Das (CJ), Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar
Opinions
Unanimous. Judgment of the Court delivered by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.

Questions on this case

4 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:

  1. Question 1, Interpretation of Statutes Practice Set 2 — Aids & Doctrines

    The doctrine of 'severability' allows a court to:

    1. A. Strike down an entire statute for any single defect
    2. B. Merge two statutes into one
    3. C. Extend a statute's operation retrospectively
    4. D. Strike down only the unconstitutional part of a statute, keeping the valid part intact
    Show the answer

    D. Strike down only the unconstitutional part of a statute, keeping the valid part intact

    Under the doctrine of severability, only the part of a statute that is invalid is struck down if the valid part can stand independently (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957; Article 13 uses 'to the extent of such inconsistency').