Law Maker

Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan

Supreme Court of India, 8 February 1957, 5 judges, 1957 AIR 510; 1957 SCR 605

A provision letting the Rajpramukh extend, by notification, the life of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 was conditional, not delegated, legislation and valid; the Ordinance also survived challenge under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f).

Facts

On 21 June 1949 the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan, then the legislative authority of the State, promulgated the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 to stop landholders ejecting tenants. Section 3 said it would remain in force for two years unless the Rajpramukh extended that period by notification. He extended it by notifications of 14 June 1951 and 20 June 1953, after the State Legislature had come into being on 29 March 1952. A later Ordinance and Act No. X of 1954 re-enacted Section 3 with longer periods. Landowners, against whom tenants had pending applications under the Ordinance, petitioned under Article 32 challenging the Ordinance, the notifications and the 1954 Act.

Questions before the Court

  1. Was Section 3 of the Ordinance, which let the Rajpramukh extend its life, an invalid delegation of legislative power?
  2. Was the notification of 20 June 1953 invalid because the Rajpramukh's power to legislate under Article 385 had ended when the State Legislature was constituted?
  3. Did the Ordinance violate Article 14, in particular through the exemption power in Section 15?
  4. Did the Ordinance impose unreasonable restrictions under Article 19(1)(f) by obliging owners to keep tenants?

What the Court held

  • A law that lets an outside authority bring it into force when it decides is conditional legislation and valid. It makes no difference that the legislature fixed the period of the law and let the outside authority extend it if the facts that called for the law continued. Section 3 was conditional legislation and intra vires.
  • The Court disagreed with Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar so far as it held that a power to extend the life of an enactment cannot validly be given to an outside authority.
  • The 1953 notification was an exercise of power under Section 3 of the Ordinance, not fresh legislation. Its validity was co-extensive with the Ordinance, which did not lapse when the Rajpramukh's legislative authority ended.
  • Section 15 was not unguided, since the preamble set out the legislative policy that governs it; in any case it was severable. Choosing 1 April 1948 as the starting date was for the legislature.
  • Requiring an owner who is not himself a tiller to assure the actual tiller some fixity of tenure is not unreasonable, especially in temporary emergency legislation. The petitions were dismissed without costs.

Why it matters

The judgment draws the line between conditional and delegated legislation, following Queen v. Burah, and holds that a legislature may leave to an executive authority not only when a law begins but whether its fixed term should be extended. It declines to follow the contrary view in Jatindra Nath Gupta, and it treats a notification under such a power as an exercise of power under the parent law, not fresh legislation.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“It is true that that section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption could be granted, but the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearness the policy of the Legislature; and as that governs s. 15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said to be unguided.”
Venkatarama Ayyar, J.Page 11 of the judgment
“When such extension is decided by the Rajpramukh and notified, the law that will operate is the law which was enacted by the legislative authority in respect of " place, person, laws, powers ", and it is clearly conditional and not delegated legislation as laid down in The Queen v. Burah (1), and must, in consequence, be held to be valid.”
Venkatarama Ayyar, J.Page 10 of the judgment
“The true position is that it is in his character as the authority on whom power was conferred under s. 3 of the Ordinance that the Rajpramukh issued the impugned notification, and not as the legislative authority of the State. This objection should accordingly be overruled.”
Venkatarama Ayyar, J.Page 11 of the judgment
“The object of the Ordinance, as set out in the preamble, is clearly not to put a restriction on the right of an owner to himself cultivate the lands, but to prevent him when he had inducted a tenant on the land from getting rid of him without sufficient cause.”
Venkatarama Ayyar, J.Page 12 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Case and bench

Parties
Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (and connected petitions)
Case
Petitions Nos. 50, 145, 149, 150, 188, 243, 261, 266 and 362 of 1955 and 205 of 1956 (under Article 32)
Decided
8 February 1957
Bench
T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, Sudhi Ranjan Das (CJ), Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar
Opinions
Unanimous. Judgment of the Court delivered by Venkatarama Ayyar, J.

Questions on this case

From free Law Maker papers. Try each one before you open the answer.

  1. Question 1, Administrative Law Practice Set 1

    A State law fixes its own duration at two years but empowers the Government to extend its operation by notification for a further period if satisfied that the conditions which called for the law continue to exist. The power is challenged as an unconstitutional delegation. Following Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1957), the power is:

    1. A. void, because only a court can decide whether the original conditions continue
    2. B. valid only if every extension is later approved by the State Legislature by a resolution
    3. C. valid, being conditional legislation within a policy fixed by the Legislature itself
    4. D. void, because extending the life of a law is an essential legislative function
    Show the answer

    C. valid, being conditional legislation within a policy fixed by the Legislature itself

    Sardar Inder Singh (1957) held that it makes no difference to the conditional character of a law that the legislature, having fixed its duration, empowers an outside authority to extend it if satisfied that the state of facts which called for it continues. The contrary view of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta was dissented from.

  2. Question 2, Administrative Law Practice Set 1

    A statute provides that it shall come into force in such areas and on such dates as the State Government may, by notification, appoint. In the language of the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1957), such a provision is:

    1. A. a Henry VIII clause, and it is void
    2. B. sub-delegation, valid only with express words
    3. C. excessive delegation, and it is void
    4. D. conditional legislation, and it is valid
    Show the answer

    D. conditional legislation, and it is valid

    Sardar Inder Singh (1957), relying on Queen v. Burah, held that a provision empowering an outside authority to bring an Act into force at such time as it may determine is conditional and not delegated legislation, and is valid. The legislature has made the law; the authority only decides when the condition for its operation is satisfied.