Shared Household Under the DV Act After Satish Chander Ahuja

A shared household under section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a household where the woman lives or has at any stage lived in a domestic relationship, and it need not be owned or rented by her husband. In Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, decided on 15 October 2020, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that a house belonging to the husband's relatives can be the wife's shared household, and that S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (2006) did not lay down the correct law. The same judgment also made clear that this is a right to reside, not a right to own, and that owners such as elderly in-laws can still go to a civil court.

What does section 2(s) actually say?

Section 2(s) is a long definition with three limbs, and most mistakes come from reading only the first one. The table breaks it up.

The words "lives or at any stage has lived" carry the weight. A woman who has been thrown out does not lose her shared household by the act of being thrown out. Read the full text of section 2, including clause (f) on "domestic relationship", before going further.

How the right of residence works under sections 17 and 19

Section 17 gives the right and section 19 gives the remedy. Under section 17(1), every woman in a domestic relationship has the right to reside in the shared household "whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same". Section 17(2) adds that she shall not be evicted or excluded from it by the respondent "save in accordance with the procedure established by law".

The Magistrate enforces this through a residence order under section 19, on an application under section 12, and may grant interim or ex parte orders under section 23. The menu of orders is wide:

• restraining the respondent from dispossessing her or disturbing her possession, whether or not he has a legal or equitable interest in the house;
• directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
• restraining him or his relatives from entering the portion where she lives;
• restraining him from alienating, disposing of or encumbering the house, or renouncing his rights in it without leave;
• directing him to secure the same level of alternate accommodation, or to pay rent for it.

One limit is built into the proviso: no order directing a person to remove himself from the house, under clause (b), can be passed against a woman. A mother-in-law can be restrained from dispossessing the daughter-in-law, but she cannot be ordered out of her own home.

What S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra had held

S.R. Batra read section 2(s) narrowly, tying the shared household to the husband's property rights. The wife had lived with her husband in a house owned exclusively by her mother-in-law. A two-judge bench held that the wife could claim a right of residence only in a house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or a house belonging to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The mother-in-law's house was neither, so the daughter-in-law had no claim to stay there.

The bench worried that a wider reading would let a wife claim residence in every house where she had lived with her husband, including houses of his relatives. For fourteen years this was the binding test, and a wife living in a house that stood in a parent-in-law's name had no claim to stay on. The S.R. Batra judgment page sets out the reasoning that was later rejected.

What the Supreme Court decided in Satish Chander Ahuja

The three-judge bench, speaking through Ashok Bhushan, J., with R. Subhash Reddy and M.R. Shah, JJ., unanimously overruled S.R. Batra on the meaning of shared household. The facts are worth knowing because they produced the second half of the judgment.

Satish Chander Ahuja owned a house in New Delhi. His son married Sneha Ahuja in 1995, and the couple lived on the first floor. The son filed for divorce in 2014, and in 2015 Sneha applied under section 12 of the DV Act against her husband and parents-in-law. The Magistrate passed an interim order restraining them from alienating the house or dispossessing her without a court order. The father-in-law, a senior citizen, then sued her for a mandatory and permanent injunction, saying the house was his self-acquired property and her stay was only permissive. The trial court decreed the suit on admissions under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Delhi High Court set aside the decree and remanded the suit, and the father-in-law appealed.

The Court held:

1. Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that the shared household must be a joint family household or one in which the husband has a share. A house belonging to any relative of the husband, in which she lived in a domestic relationship, can qualify.
2. S.R. Batra did not correctly interpret section 2(s) and does not lay down the correct law.
3. Section 2(s), read with sections 17 and 19, gives the woman a right of residence irrespective of whether she has any legal interest in the house.
4. "Procedure established by law" in section 17(2) means proceedings before a competent court, so an owner's suit for injunction, eviction or possession is maintainable.
5. The trial court was wrong to decree the suit on admissions, because her claim of a right of residence had to be decided, and section 26 allowed her to raise it in the civil suit itself.
6. An interim or final order under section 19 does not bar civil proceedings. It is relevant evidence in the civil suit under section 43 of the Evidence Act, now section 37 of the BSA, but the civil court decides on the evidence before it.

The High Court's remand was upheld. Read the holdings in full on the Satish Chander Ahuja judgment page.

Living with "some permanency": which houses qualify

Not every house the couple ever stayed in becomes a shared household; the Court required residence with some permanency. Paragraph 63 says the living of a woman in a household "has to refer to a living which has some permanency", and that fleeting or casual living at different places does not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of the living decide the question. The Court identified the shared household as the one where she was living when the application was filed, or from which she had recently been excluded, or from which she was temporarily absent.

Three hypothetical situations show how this works:

• The in-laws' flat. Suppose Kavita lived for six years with her husband in a flat owned by his mother. After S.R. Batra she had no claim. After Satish Chander Ahuja, the flat can be her shared household.
• The holiday home. Suppose the couple spent two weeks each summer at the husband's uncle's cottage in the hills. That is casual, occasional living, and the cottage would not be a shared household.
• The house she was pushed out of. Suppose she was locked out of the matrimonial home a month before she applied and is staying with her parents. The matrimonial home remains her shared household, because she was recently excluded.

Balancing her right against the owner's

The right of residence is real but not absolute, and the Court said so in terms. In paragraph 83 it observed that the right under section 19 "is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared household", especially where the daughter-in-law is pitted against aged parents-in-law, who are also entitled to live peacefully. Courts must balance both sides, which is why section 19(1)(f) allows alternate accommodation or rent in place of residence in the same house.

Two months later, in S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District (15 December 2020), a bench led by D.Y. Chandrachud, J. dealt with the other side of the problem: in-laws using the summary procedure of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to evict a daughter-in-law. The Court held that the two statutes must be harmoniously construed, and that a woman's right to a residence order in a shared household cannot be defeated "by the simple expedient" of an eviction order under the Senior Citizens Act. The Tribunal must mould relief after noticing both sets of claims.

The practical sequence after these two cases looks like this:

1. The woman applies under section 12 and may get an interim residence order under section 23.
2. The owner may file a civil suit for possession or injunction, which is maintainable.
3. In that suit she can claim her right of residence under section 26, and the Magistrate's order is relevant but not binding.
4. The civil court decides on evidence, balancing her need for a roof against the owner's interest, and may direct alternate accommodation.
5. If she obtains relief in any other forum, section 26(3) obliges her to inform the Magistrate.

Who can be a respondent, and must she still be living there?

The definition of respondent was widened by the Supreme Court in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016), which struck down the words "adult male" in section 2(q) as violative of Article 14. Female relatives, including a mother-in-law, can therefore be respondents in their own right. Satish Chander Ahuja relied on this to hold that the father-in-law in that case could be treated as a respondent, while noting that she must still plead and prove the conditions for relief.

In Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022), the Supreme Court held that the domestic relationship must have existed between the woman and the respondent, but it need not subsist on the date of the application. A woman who at any point lived, or had the right to live, in a shared household with the respondent and suffered domestic violence on account of that relationship can apply under section 12.

Exam questions on the shared household

Prelims questions test the definitions and the case names. Expect questions on which case overruled S.R. Batra, the bench strength in Satish Chander Ahuja (three judges), the proviso to section 19(1) on orders against women, and which section allows DV Act reliefs to be claimed in a civil suit (section 26).

Mains and judgment-writing papers prefer a problem: an owner-father-in-law sues for possession, and the daughter-in-law relies on a residence order. Examiners look for the overruling of S.R. Batra, the permanency test, the maintainability of the suit under section 17(2), the evidentiary value of the Magistrate's order, and the balancing language of paragraph 83.

Slips that lose marks:

• Writing that the wife acquires ownership or a share in the house. She acquires only a right to reside.
• Saying that a civil suit by the owner is barred while a DV case is pending. Satish Chander Ahuja holds the opposite.
• Forgetting the permanency requirement and treating every house visited as a shared household.
• Applying the old "adult male" definition of respondent after Hiral Harsora.
• Citing section 43 of the Evidence Act without its BSA equivalent.

Test your recall with the family law question sets.

Key points to remember

• Section 2(s) turns on where the woman lived in a domestic relationship, not on who owns the house.
• Satish Chander Ahuja (15 October 2020, three judges) overruled S.R. Batra (2006): a house of the husband's relatives can be a shared household.
• Residence must have some permanency; casual or fleeting stays do not count.
• Sections 17 and 19 give a right of residence and protection from eviction except by due process; no removal order under section 19(1)(b) can be passed against a woman.
• An owner's civil suit is maintainable, and the woman can claim her residence right in it under section 26.
• A section 19 order is relevant evidence in the civil suit but does not bind the civil court.
• S. Vanitha (2020): the Senior Citizens Act cannot be used to override a woman's shared household right.

Where to go next

Read the bare text of section 26 after the three judgments, because it ties the Magistrate's jurisdiction to civil and family courts, and then practise a short mains answer on an owner's suit for possession. For a public-facing account of how a domestic violence complaint is filed and what reliefs can be sought, see the LegalFirms guide to filing a domestic violence complaint. Anyone dealing with an actual dispute over the matrimonial home can ask a family lawyer through Ask a Lawyer on LegalFirms. This is general information, and a lawyer should be consulted on the facts of a specific case.