Anumandala Rajesh Reddy v. State of Karnataka
Supreme Court of India, 24 August 2026, 2 judges, 2026 INSC 1039
Sanction under Section 197 CrPC is needed only for taking cognizance, not for registering an FIR or investigating on a Section 156(3) direction, and Priyanka Srivastava was substantially complied with where the complainant had repeatedly approached the police first.
Facts
The appellant alleged that police officials of Ramanagara District, acting with his former business associates, detained him, coerced him into signing away his partnership and shares, and tampered with his phone and laptop while he was in custody. The police refused to register his complaint, so he emailed a complaint to the DCP on 28 December 2020 and complained to the Director General and Inspector General of Police on 27 November 2021. He then filed a private complaint, PCR No. 57 of 2022, and on 1 August 2022 the Magistrate at Channapatna directed investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, leading to FIR Crime No. 73 of 2022. On petitions under Section 482 CrPC by the accused police officials (Accused Nos. 4 and 8 to 11), the High Court quashed the proceedings against them for want of sanction under Section 197 CrPC and for non-compliance with Priyanka Srivastava.
Questions before the Court
- Is previous sanction under Section 197 CrPC required before an FIR is registered and investigated on a Magistrate's direction under Section 156(3) CrPC?
- Did the appellant fail to comply with the safeguards in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh by approaching the Magistrate without first approaching the police?
What the Court held
- The requirement of sanction under Section 197 CrPC comes into operation only when the Court is to take cognizance. An order under Section 156(3) directing registration of an FIR and investigation is a pre-cognizance step, so absence of sanction cannot bar registration or investigation. The High Court's contrary finding was per se erroneous.
- The Priyanka Srivastava safeguards aim to prevent routine invocation of Section 156(3) without first going to the police, and cannot be applied as a mere procedural formality divorced from the facts of the case.
- The appellant had repeatedly approached the local police and then the DCP and the Director General and Inspector General of Police. Addressing the later complaint to them instead of the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) did not affect his bona fides, and the object of Priyanka Srivastava stood substantially fulfilled.
- The High Court's order was set aside, the Final Report filed as a consequence of the quashing was to be reopened and the investigation resumed, and the Investigating Officer was to keep in mind the desirability of seeking sanction if the offences were found proved and the acts were done in discharge of official duty.
Why it matters
The judgment holds that previous sanction under Section 197 CrPC (Section 218 BNSS) is a condition only for taking cognizance and cannot be used to quash an FIR or stop investigation at the pre-cognizance stage. It also explains that the Priyanka Srivastava requirements are to be applied by their purpose, so substantial prior recourse to the police, including to superior officers, satisfies them.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“The concept of obtaining sanction under Section 197 CrPC at the stage of registration of an FIR is alien to the scheme of CrPC or BNSS. An order under Section 156(3) CrPC directing registration of an FIR and investigation is a pre-cognizance step and does not amount to taking cognizance of the offence. Consequently, where the Magistrate has, by exercising powers under Section 156(3) CrPC, directed registration of an FIR and to conduct investigation, the absence or otherwise of previous sanction under Section 197 CrPC cannot operate as a bar to such registration and investigation.”
“The safeguards enunciated in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) cannot be divorced from the object sought to be achieved by the said decision. The directions therein were intended to ensure that the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC is not invoked in a routine or mechanical manner and that a complainant does not directly approach the Magistrate without first availing the remedies available before the police authorities.”
“The ratio of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) has to be understood in the light of the mischief which the said decision sought to curb. The law is governed by reason, and a judicial direction intended to prevent abuse of a statutory remedy cannot be applied in a manner which defeats the very purpose for which the safeguard was evolved. Where the complainant has, in substance, approached the police authorities and thereafter pursued the matter before superior police authorities, the inference of a direct and casual invocation of Section 156(3) CrPC, without first giving the police an opportunity to act, would not arise.”
Provisions interpreted
- Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Now: BNSS 218 (NCRB correspondence table)
- Section 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Now: BNSS 175(1) (NCRB correspondence table)
- Section 154(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Now: BNSS 173(3) (NCRB correspondence table)
Case and bench
- Parties
- Sri Anumandala Rajesh Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Anr.
- Case
- Criminal Appeal of 2026 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1137 of 2025, with connected appeals
- Decided
- 24 August 2026
- Bench
- Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta
- Opinions
- Judgment of the Court delivered by Sandeep Mehta, J.