Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation
Supreme Court of India, 16 September 2026, 2 judges, 2026 INSC 999
Where an intermediary receives bribe money, the prosecution must prove that the demand is attributable to the accused and that the money reached or was meant for him; uncorroborated approver evidence was insufficient and the convictions were set aside.
Facts
The appellant, Divisional Security Commissioner of the Railway Protection Force at Palakkad, was alleged to have collected bribes from RPF personnel seeking transfers and postings through subordinate officials acting as intermediaries. In a CBI trap on 04.08.2005 an intermediary (PW-2) was caught accepting money from the complainant (PW-6); the appellant was not caught. Two intermediaries were later pardoned under Section 306 CrPC and examined as approvers. The Special Judge, Ernakulam convicted the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in C.C. No. 2 of 2014 (the trap transaction) and C.C. No. 3 of 2015. The Kerala High Court affirmed the conviction in the first case and, in the second, only for the transaction involving PW-11, in which the appellant was said to have received money at his residence through the other intermediary (PW-7). The appellant appealed.
Questions before the Court
- Was it proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded illegal gratification, directly or through the intermediaries?
- Were the amounts received by the intermediaries accepted or obtained on behalf of the appellant?
- Was the evidence of the approvers reliable and corroborated in material particulars?
- Could the presumption under Section 20 of the Act be drawn?
What the Court held
- Before liability is fastened on a public servant for money received by an intermediary, the prosecution must prove by reliable evidence that the intermediary acted under his authority or for his benefit and that the demand was attributable to him; the nexus cannot be presumed because the intermediary was a subordinate or close to him.
- In the trap case, recovery from the intermediary showed only that he received money. The trap was closed before the money could reach the appellant, and the claim that it was to be taken to his residence rested on the approver's uncorroborated word.
- Following Neeraj Dutta, the presumption under Section 20 arises only after acceptance or obtainment by the accused is proved, and inference from circumstances cannot bridge the gap between collection by an intermediary and receipt by the accused.
- In the PW-11 transaction, the bribe giver and the approver corroborating each other is not independent corroboration; with no recovery and an unrefuted diary alibi, the charge was not proved. Both appeals were allowed and the appellant acquitted.
Why it matters
The judgment applies the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta to bribes routed through intermediaries. Relying on R.P.S. Yadav, it holds that a demand and a handover to an intermediary are not enough: the chain must be proved to the point where the money reached or was meant for the accused. It also states that an approver and a bribe giver who took part in the same transaction cannot supply the independent corroboration required for accomplice evidence.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“The principles governing approver evidence assume particular significance in corruption prosecutions where the alleged demand and acceptance are sought to be proved through intermediaries who participated in the transactions. In such cases, the Court must scrutinise the evidence with great care and caution and must satisfy itself that the testimony of the approver receives assurance from independent witnesses or circumstances and reliable corroborative material before acting upon it.”
“The case thus shows that a demand and an initial handover to an intermediary are not enough; the chain must be carried through, by cogent evidence, to the point where the money is shown to have actually reached or been intended for the accused failing which the conviction cannot stand.”
“In cases of intermediary evidence generally, the existence of a nexus between an intermediary and the accused must itself be proved by reliable evidence and cannot be presumed merely because the intermediary happened to be subordinate or was allegedly close to the accused. Nor does Section 20 of the Act assist the prosecution, since it operates only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance attributable to the accused are established, which is precisely what is missing here.”
“That is not independent corroboration in the sense required by the rule of prudence applicable to accomplice evidence, corroboration by an observer not connected with or part of the transaction which endows it with the character of independence.”
Provisions interpreted
- Section 7, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- Section 13(1) and 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- Section 20, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- Section 133, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Now: BSA 138 (NCRB correspondence table)
- Section 114, Illustration (b), Indian Evidence Act, 1872Now: BSA 119 (NCRB correspondence table)
Related judgments
- Follows Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2022)“Therefore, in the light of Neeraj Dutta (supra) case, the foundational facts necessary before any presumption of fact can be drawn that, the appellant himself demanded or accepted the amount, have not been established” (page 60)
Case and bench
- Parties
- Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 4732 of 2024, with Criminal Appeal No. 4733 of 2024
- Decided
- 16 September 2026
- Bench
- Dipankar Datta, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
- Opinions
- Unanimous judgment of the Court by Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J., with Dipankar Datta, J.