C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera
Supreme Court of India, 3 February 2026, 2 judges, 2026 INSC 112
An application under Section 29A(5) to extend an arbitrator's mandate is maintainable even after the mandate has expired and an award has been made; that award is unenforceable, but the court's power to extend is unaffected.
Facts
Disputes arose between the parties under three agreements to sell, and the Madras High Court appointed a sole arbitrator under Section 11 in April 2022. Pleadings were completed on 20.08.2022, and the parties by consent under Section 29A(3) extended the mandate by six months, to 20.02.2024. The matter was reserved for award, reopened during settlement talks and reserved again, and the award was made on 11.05.2024, after the mandate had ended. The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 on the ground that the mandate had expired. On 12.11.2024 the appellant applied under Section 29A for extension of the mandate. On 24.01.2025 the High Court dismissed that application as not maintainable, holding that an award made after expiry of the mandate is a nullity and that the 1996 Act, unlike the 1940 Act, allows no extension after an award. The appellant appealed.
Questions before the Court
- Can a court entertain an application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to extend the arbitrator's mandate after an award has been made, though after expiry of the eighteen month period?
What the Court held
- Section 29A does not bar an application for extension after an award is delivered. An award made after the mandate expired is non est, better described as unenforceable under Section 36, and it need not be challenged under Section 34.
- The arbitrator's unilateral act of making an award without a mandate does not affect the court's power and jurisdiction under Section 29A. The words 'if an award is not made' in Section 29A(4) do not deal with a post-mandate award; the provision lets the court extend before or after expiry, and termination is not final (Rohan Builders approved).
- Parliament intended arbitral proceedings to reach a binding award: the court may extend before or after expiry, the mandate continues while an extension application is pending, and proceedings continue on substitution of the arbitrator.
- There is no automatic extension. The court must find sufficient cause, may impose terms, reduce the arbitrator's fees, impose costs, or substitute the arbitrator as a matter of discretion. If the mandate is extended, the tribunal resumes from the stage at which it expired and concludes within the time granted.
- The appeal was allowed, and the Section 29A application was restored to the High Court for decision on these principles.
Why it matters
The judgment settles that the court's power to extend an arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A survives the arbitrator making an award after the mandate has expired. It approves the observations in Rohan Builders, sets out the principles governing Section 29A, describes the court's powers under it as a toolkit to be used on close scrutiny, and clarifies that substitution of the arbitrator on extension is discretionary, not inevitable.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“In conclusion, we hold that an application under Section 29A(5) for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator is maintainable even after the expiry of the time under Sections 29A(1) and (3) and even after rendering of an award during that time. Such an award is ineffective and unenforceable. But the power of the court to consider extension is not impaired by such an indiscretion of the arbitrator.”
“Section 29A of the Act does not, in terms, bar an application for extension of the mandate of an arbitrator in the event of the delivery of an award. There is no such prescription anywhere in the section. In the first place, if an award is made after expiry of the mandate, then there is no doubt about the fact that such an award is non est. A better expression would be to hold that such an award would be unenforceable under Section 36. Such an award need not be challenged under Section 34.”
“This apprehension is not true. There is no automatic extension of time. The Court will and must exercise its discretion only after evaluating the facts and circumstances after close scrutiny. Section 29A, in terms, enables the court to adopt distinct measures to ensure dynamic and efficient conduct of arbitral proceedings with integrity and expedition.”
Provisions interpreted
Case and bench
- Parties
- C. Velusamy v. K Indhera
- Case
- Civil Appeal No. ___ of 2026 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 6551 of 2025)
- Decided
- 3 February 2026
- Bench
- Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Atul S. Chandurkar
- Opinions
- Judgment of the Court, signed by Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.; the text as printed does not name the author.