Under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as substituted in 2005, the daughter of a Mitakshara coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth, with the same rights and the same liabilities as a son. In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, decided on 11 August 2020, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that this right does not depend on the father being alive on 9 September 2005, because the right comes from birth and not from the father's survival. The same judgment narrowed the scope for brothers to defeat a sister's claim by pleading an old oral partition.
What did section 6 say before the 2005 amendment?
Before 2005, a daughter was never a coparcener; she could only inherit a slice of her father's share. The original section 6 kept the rule of survivorship for Mitakshara coparcenary property. When a male coparcener died, his interest passed to the surviving coparceners, who were all male. The proviso carved out one exception: if he left a female relative in Class I of the Schedule (a daughter, widow or mother, for instance), his interest was worked out through a notional partition and passed by succession rather than survivorship.
The daughter therefore received a share of her father's notional share. She could not demand partition of the joint family property, could not be its karta, and had no birthright in it. Several states had moved earlier: Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, among others, amended the law to make daughters coparceners, and Kerala abolished the joint family system altogether. The Law Commission's 174th Report recommended a national change, and Parliament enacted the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.
What exactly changed in section 6 after 2005?
The substituted section 6 puts the daughter in the same position as a son, subject to a saving for transactions completed before 20 December 2004. Keep the text of section 6 beside you as you read this table.
| Provision | What it does |
|---|---|
| Section 6(1)(a) to (c) | Daughter becomes a coparcener by birth, has the same rights as a son, and is subject to the same liabilities |
| Proviso to section 6(1) | Saves any disposition, alienation, partition or testamentary disposition made before 20 December 2004 |
| Section 6(2) | Property she gets as coparcener is held with coparcenary incidents and can be disposed of by her will |
| Section 6(3) | If a Hindu dies after the amendment, his coparcenary interest passes by testamentary or intestate succession, not survivorship; daughter gets the same share as a son |
| Section 6(4) | Abolishes the son's pious obligation to pay the father's debts, with a saving for debts taken before the amendment |
| Section 6(5) and Explanation | Section does not apply to a partition effected before 20 December 2004; "partition" means a registered partition deed or a court decree |
The same amending Act also omitted section 23, which had restricted a female heir's right to seek partition of a dwelling house occupied by the family.
Two dates matter and students mix them up constantly. 9 September 2005 is when the amendment came into force. 20 December 2004 is the date the Bill was tabled in the Rajya Sabha, and it is the cut-off for the savings in section 6(1) and section 6(5).
Why did the Supreme Court have to decide Vineeta Sharma?
Two division benches had taken opposite views on whether the father had to be alive when the amendment began. In Prakash v. Phulavati (2015), the Court held the amendment prospective and said both the coparcener father and his daughter had to be living on 9 September 2005. A daughter whose father died earlier, on this view, had no coparcenary claim at all.
Then in Danamma v. Amar (2018), the Court gave daughters equal shares with sons even though their father had died in 2001, because a partition suit was still pending when the amendment arrived. High Courts and trial courts were left choosing between two binding precedents, and the issue was referred to a bench of three judges: Arun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer and M.R. Shah, JJ.
What did the Court hold in Vineeta Sharma?
The Court answered the reference in five propositions, which are worth learning almost word for word. They appear in paragraph 129 of the official judgment.
- Substituted section 6 confers coparcener status on a daughter born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as a son, with the same rights and liabilities.
- A daughter born earlier can claim these rights with effect from 9 September 2005, subject to the savings in section 6(1) for dispositions, alienations, partitions and testamentary dispositions made before 20 December 2004.
- Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, the father coparcener need not have been living on 9 September 2005.
- The notional partition under the proviso to the original section 6 did not bring about an actual partition or disrupt the coparcenary. It was only a device to calculate the deceased's share. Even where a preliminary decree has been passed, daughters must get an equal share in pending final decree proceedings or appeals.
- Because of the Explanation to section 6(5), a plea of oral partition cannot ordinarily be accepted. It may be accepted only in exceptional cases where it is supported by public documents and the partition was finally carried out as if a court decree had effected it. Oral evidence alone is not enough.
The Court overruled Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju on the contrary view and overruled Danamma in part. It also requested courts to decide pending matters on the question, as far as possible, within six months.
Is the 2005 amendment retrospective or retroactive?
The Court called section 6 retroactive: it operates from 2005 but attaches consequences to an earlier event, the daughter's birth. A retrospective law reaches back and changes rights as they stood in the past. A prospective law looks only at events after it begins. A retroactive law sits between the two, operating in the present on the basis of a fact that happened before.
That classification is what removes the "living father" requirement. The daughter's status is triggered by her birth, which may be in 1960 or 1990, and the statute gives her the rights of that status from 9 September 2005. Whether her father was alive on that date has nothing to do with the trigger. The saving for transactions before 20 December 2004 then protects third parties and settled partitions from being reopened.
What kind of partition defeats a daughter's claim?
Only a partition completed before 20 December 2004 by a registered deed or by a court decree takes property out of the daughter's reach. The Explanation to section 6(5) was not in the Bill as introduced; it was added later on a committee's recommendation, precisely because families could manufacture paper partitions or claim an oral division to cut out daughters after the law changed. A partition deed under the Registration Act, 1908 leaves a public record; an oral arrangement does not.
Vineeta Sharma leaves a narrow door open. Suppose brothers prove that their father's land was divided orally in 1990, that separate revenue entries have stood in each brother's name for decades, and that each has paid tax and dealt with his portion as owner ever since. A court may accept that partition if the public documents show it was carried through as completely as a decree would have done. Stray mutation entries or a few receipts will not do.
A preliminary decree is not the end of the road either. If a partition suit filed in 2002 reached a preliminary decree in 2004 but the final decree was still pending in 2005, the daughter must be given her equal share at the final decree stage or in appeal.
How does the ruling apply to real family situations?
The ruling turns on whether a coparcenary still existed after 2005 and whether a saved partition had already ended it. Three short hypothetical cases show how to reason.
Case one. Suppose Mohan, a coparcener, died in 2001, leaving a son, Rakesh, and a daughter, Kavita. Rakesh continues to live jointly with his own son, and no registered partition or decree exists. Under Prakash, Kavita had no coparcenary claim because Mohan was dead in 2005. After Vineeta Sharma, Kavita is a coparcener from 9 September 2005 and can sue for partition of the coparcenary property. Mohan's own share, which passed by succession in 2001 through the notional partition, is worked out separately and does not reopen.
Case two. Suppose instead that Mohan and Rakesh had executed and registered a partition deed in 2000, a year before Mohan died, dividing all the joint property between them. That partition predates 20 December 2004 and is saved. Kavita cannot reopen it, though the portion allotted to Mohan became his separate property, and she inherits from it as a Class I heir under section 8.
Case three. Suppose Rakesh sold a joint family plot to an outsider in 2003 for consideration. The proviso to section 6(1) protects that alienation. Kavita's claim lies against the remaining coparcenary property, not against the buyer.
A sister in any of these positions who wants to understand her options in plain language can be pointed to the LegalFirms guide on a daughter's property rights in India and the guide on filing a partition suit.
How is Vineeta Sharma asked in judiciary exams?
Examiners test the dates, the overruled cases and the oral partition rule more than the general principle. In prelims, expect options that swap 20 December 2004 and 9 September 2005, or that describe Danamma as wholly overruled. Questions also ask which word the Court used for the amendment (retroactive) and what "partition" means under the Explanation to section 6(5).
In mains, the common form is a problem question with a father who died before 2005, a partition suit pending at some stage, and a brother pleading oral partition. A strong answer identifies the governing provision, states the five propositions briefly, applies the savings, and comes to a definite share.
Common mistakes in answer scripts:
- Applying section 6 to the father's self-acquired property, which is governed by section 8 and the Class I list.
- Saying a married daughter is excluded. The section draws no such distinction.
- Forgetting section 6(1)(c): the daughter takes on liabilities too.
- Treating a preliminary decree as a bar to the daughter's share.
- Citing Prakash v. Phulavati as current law.
Practise these traps through the Hindu law mock tests and the family law questions in previous year papers.
Key points to remember
- A daughter of a Mitakshara coparcener is a coparcener by birth under substituted section 6, with equal rights and equal liabilities.
- Her rights can be claimed from 9 September 2005; the father need not have been alive on that date.
- Dispositions, alienations, partitions and wills made before 20 December 2004 are saved.
- Only a registered partition deed or a court decree counts as partition under the Explanation to section 6(5); oral partition succeeds only in exceptional cases backed by public documents.
- A preliminary decree does not shut out the daughter; she shares equally at the final decree stage or in appeal.
- Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal are overruled; Danamma is overruled only in part.
- The amendment is retroactive, not retrospective.
Where to go next
Read the full summary of Vineeta Sharma on Law Maker and then the two cases it resolved. Keep the bare text of section 6 open while you revise, because the proviso and the Explanation carry most of the marks. If you are building a routine for reading cases like this one, the post on building a case law reading habit is a good next step, and the state judiciary pages show where personal law carries weight in your target exam. For a real family dispute rather than an exam problem, a family or property lawyer can answer specific questions through Ask a Lawyer on LegalFirms.