Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma
Supreme Court of India · 11 August 2020 · 3 judges
A daughter is a coparcener by birth under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as substituted in 2005, with the same rights and liabilities as a son, whether or not her father was alive on 9 September 2005.
Facts
The interpretation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as substituted by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, was referred to a larger Bench because two Division Bench judgments conflicted. Prakash v. Phulavati held that the provision is prospective and applies only where both the coparcener and his daughter were alive on 9.9.2005. Danamma gave daughters a share although their father had died in 2001, before the substituted provision came into force. Connected special leave petitions raised related questions: whether the father had to be alive in 2005, whether daughters could claim a share where only a preliminary decree had been passed in a partition suit, and whether oral or unregistered partitions fall within the Explanation to Section 6(5).
Questions before the Court
- Whether a daughter becomes a coparcener under substituted Section 6 only if her father coparcener was alive on 9.9.2005.
- Whether the substituted Section 6 is retrospective, prospective or retroactive in operation.
- Whether the statutory notional partition under the original Section 6 disrupted the coparcenary, and the effect of a preliminary decree in a pending partition suit.
- Whether a plea of oral partition can be accepted in view of the Explanation to Section 6(5).
What the Court held
- Substituted Section 6 confers the status of coparcener on a daughter born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as a son, with the same rights and liabilities.
- The daughter can claim these rights with effect from 9.9.2005, subject to the saving in Section 6(1) for dispositions, alienations, partitions or testamentary dispositions made before 20.12.2004. The provision is retroactive: it operates from 2005 but rests on the antecedent event of birth.
- Since the right in coparcenary arises by birth, the father coparcener need not have been living on 9.9.2005.
- The notional partition under the proviso to the original Section 6 only served to work out the deceased coparcener's share and did not bring about an actual partition. Daughters must get an equal share in pending final decree proceedings or appeals even after a preliminary decree.
- A plea of oral partition cannot ordinarily be accepted against the Explanation to Section 6(5); it may be accepted only in exceptional cases where public documents support it and the partition was finally carried out as if by a decree of a court.
- Contrary views in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju are overruled, and Danamma is partly overruled to the extent it is contrary.
Why it matters
The judgment resolves the conflict between Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma by holding that a daughter's coparcenary right under the 2005 amendment arises from birth and does not depend on the father being alive in 2005. It explains the difference between retrospective and retroactive statutes, limits the effect of the notional partition and of preliminary decrees, and requests that pending matters on the question be decided as far as possible within six months.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“(i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and liabilities. (ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004. (iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.”
“The conferral of right is by birth, and the rights are given in the same manner with incidents of coparcenary as that of a son and she is treated as a coparcener in the same manner with the same rights as if she had been a son at the time of birth. Though the rights can be claimed, w.e.f. 9.9.2005, the provisions are of retroactive application; they confer benefits based on the antecedent event, and the Mitakshara coparcenary law shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter as a coparcener.”
“(v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.”
Provisions interpreted
Related judgments
- Overrules Prakash v. Phulavati (2015)“we overrule the views to the contrary expressed in Prakash v. Phulavati” (page 120)
- Overrules Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar (2018)“The opinion expressed in Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar is partly overruled to the extent it is contrary to this decision.” (page 120)
Case and bench
- Parties
- Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma
- Case
- Civil Appeal Diary No. 32601 of 2018
- Decided
- 11 August 2020
- Bench
- Arun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer, M.R. Shah
- Opinions
- Unanimous. Judgment of the Court delivered by Arun Mishra J.
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