A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras
Supreme Court of India · 19 May 1950 · 6 judges · 1950 AIR 27; 1950 SCR 88
Overruled in whole or in part by Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970), which says: “the assumption in A. K. Gopalan's case(1) that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters”
The majority upheld the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, except Section 14, holding that 'law' in Article 21 means State-made law and that preventive detention is not tested under Article 19; the habeas corpus petition was dismissed.
Facts
The petitioner had been under detention in Madras since December 1947; his convictions under the ordinary criminal law had been set aside. On 1 March 1950, while detained under an order of the Madras Government, he was served with an order under Section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. He petitioned the Supreme Court under Article 32 for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the Act contravened Articles 13, 19 and 21 and did not comply with Article 22, and that the order was mala fide. Because Section 14 of the Act made it an offence to disclose the grounds of detention, he did not place them before the Court. This was the first case in which the Court considered the Chapter on Fundamental Rights.
Questions before the Court
- Is a law of preventive detention to be tested against the freedoms in Article 19(1), in particular Article 19(1)(d) read with Article 19(5)?
- Does 'procedure established by law' in Article 21 mean State-made law, or does it import principles of natural justice or due process?
- Do the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, including Sections 12 and 14, comply with Article 22 and Part III?
What the Court held
- Article 19 does not apply to a law depriving a person of personal liberty by detention. Deprivation of personal liberty is different from a restriction on freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d), and the validity of such a law is tested under Articles 21 and 22, not Article 19(5).
- In Article 21, 'law' means State-made or enacted law, and 'procedure established by law' does not import the rules of natural justice or the American doctrine of due process. Kania, CJ, Mukherjea and Das, JJ. read the phrase as procedure enacted by the legislature; Patanjali Sastri, J. read it as the ordinary, well-established criminal procedure.
- Apart from Section 14, the Act was held valid, including Section 12, which allowed detention beyond three months without reference to an Advisory Board in specified classes of cases.
- All six Judges held Section 14, which barred disclosure of the grounds of detention to the Court, void as abridging the right under Article 22(5); the majority treated it as severable from the rest of the Act.
- The petition was dismissed. Mukherjea, J. added that it would be open to the petitioner to make a fresh application if the grounds supplied to him furnished adequate reasons for it.
Why it matters
This was the first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. The majority read Articles 19, 21 and 22 as separate provisions dealing with different rights, and read 'law' in Article 21 as State-made law, rejecting due process and natural justice as tests of a law depriving personal liberty. At the same time all six Judges held invalid the bar on disclosing grounds of detention to the Court.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“The omission of the word "due", the limitation imposed by the word "procedure" and the insertion of the word "established" thus brings out more clearly the idea of legislative prescription in the expression used in article 21. By adopting the phrase "procedure established by law" the Constitution gave the legislature the final word to determine the law.”
“Deprivation of personal liberty in such a situation is not, in my opinion, within the purview of article 19 at all but is dealt with by the succeeding articles 20 and 21. In other words, article 19 guarantees to the citizens the enjoyment of certain civil liberties while they are free, while articles 20-22 secure to all persons--citizens and non-citizens--certain constitutional guarantees in regard to punishment and prevention of crime.”
“My conclusion, therefore, is that in article 21 the word "law" has been used in the sense of State-made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract or general sense embodying the principles of natural justice. The article presupposes that the law is a valid and binding law under the provisions. of the Constitution having regard to the competency of the legislature and the subject it relates to and does not infringe any of the fundamental rights which the Constitution provides for.”
“It appears to me, therefore, that section 14 of the Act in so far as it prevents the detenu from disclosing to the Court the grounds communicated to him is not in conformity with Part III of the Constitution and is, therefore, void under article 13 (2). That section, however, is clearly severable and cannot affect the whole Act.”
Provisions interpreted
- Article 21, Constitution
- Article 19(1)(d) and 19(5), Constitution
- Article 22, Constitution
- Article 13(2), Constitution
- Sections 12 and 14, Preventive Detention Act, 1950
Related judgments
- Explained in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)
Case and bench
- Parties
- A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras (Union of India: Intervener)
- Case
- Petition No. XIII of 1950 (Original Jurisdiction)
- Decided
- 19 May 1950
- Bench
- Kania, Hiralal J. (CJ), Fazal Ali, Saiyid, Sastri, M. Patanjali, Mahajan, Mehr Chand, Das, Sudhi Ranjan, Mukherjea, B.K.
- Opinions
- Majority 4:2. Separate opinions by Kania, CJ, Patanjali Sastri, Mukherjea and Das, JJ., who upheld the Act except Section 14 and dismissed the petition. Fazl Ali and Mahajan, JJ. dissented, holding Sections 12 and 14 invalid and the petitioner entitled to release.
Questions on this case
8 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:
Question 1 · Landmark Judgments Practice Set 1
In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), what did the majority hold about the Preventive Detention Act, 1950?
- A. Only Section 14, which barred disclosure to the court of the grounds of detention, was ultra vires
- B. Section 3, which empowered the Government to make detention orders, was ultra vires
- C. The Act was valid in its entirety, including its bar on disclosing the grounds of detention to the court
- D. The whole Act was void because it did not provide a fair, just and reasonable procedure
Show the answer
A. Only Section 14, which barred disclosure to the court of the grounds of detention, was ultra vires
The majority held that the Act, except Section 14, did not contravene Part III. Section 14, which prohibited disclosure of the grounds of detention to the court, offended Article 22(5) and was struck down, but being severable it did not affect the rest of the Act, so the detention was upheld.
Question 2 · Landmark Judgments Practice Set 1
The principle that a procedure depriving a person of personal liberty under Article 21 must be 'right and just and fair' and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive was laid down in:
- A. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
- B. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras
- C. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras
- D. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.
Show the answer
A. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Supreme Court held that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness under Article 14, that is, it must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. This departed from the narrower reading of 'procedure established by law' in A.K. Gopalan (1950).