A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India
Supreme Court of India · 29 April 1969
The Court set aside selections to the Indian Forest Service from Jammu and Kashmir because the Acting Chief Conservator, himself a candidate, sat on the Selection Board, holding that natural justice applies to administrative proceedings.
Facts
Under the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966, a Special Selection Board was set up to select officers of the Jammu and Kashmir forest department for the newly constituted Indian Forest Service. One member was Naqishbund, the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests, who was also a candidate. Basu, a senior Conservator, had appealed against his supersession by Naqishbund and the appeal was pending. Naqishbund did not sit when his own name was considered, but took part when the claims of his rivals Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered and when the list was prepared in order of preference. He was placed first; the three rivals were not selected. The UPSC accepted the Board's selections and the Government of India notified the list. Aggrieved officers petitioned under Article 32 to quash the notification.
Questions before the Court
- Do the principles of natural justice apply to proceedings of the Selection Board even if its power is administrative?
- Was the selection vitiated by the participation of a member who was himself a candidate?
- Did the later consideration by the Home Ministry and the final recommendation of the UPSC cure the defect?
- Should all the selections, including those to the junior scale, be set aside?
What the Court held
- The line between administrative and quasi-judicial power is thin and is being obliterated. Under the rule of law, State instrumentalities must act fairly and justly; the requirement to act judicially is in essence a requirement to act justly and fairly, not arbitrarily.
- The rules of natural justice aim to prevent miscarriage of justice, operate only where no valid law covers the field, and supplement rather than supplant the law. There is no reason why they should not apply to administrative enquiries; which rule applies depends on the facts, the governing law and the body concerned.
- The test of bias is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that the member was likely to have been biased, judged by human probabilities; mere suspicion is not enough. Naqishbund was a judge in his own cause, with a conflict between interest and duty, and his presence must have influenced the Board despite the other members' affidavits.
- Since the Board's selection was the foundation of the UPSC's recommendation, the vitiation of the Board's selection vitiated the final recommendation as well.
- As senior and junior scale selections were made from the same pool, they could not be separated. The petitions were allowed and all the impugned selections were set aside.
Why it matters
The judgment extends the principles of natural justice to administrative proceedings, rejecting the view that they apply only where a body must act judicially. It states that the dividing line between administrative and quasi-judicial power is being obliterated, adopts the reasonable likelihood of bias test, and holds that a recommendation built on a vitiated selection is itself vitiated.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.”
“The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias.”
“Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.”
Provisions interpreted
- Rule 4(1), Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966
- Regulations 3 and 5, Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966
Related judgments
- Followed in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990)
Case and bench
- Parties
- A. K. Kraipak etc. v. Union of India
- Case
- Writ Petitions Nos. 173 to 175 of 1967 (Original Jurisdiction)
- Decided
- 29 April 1969
- Bench
- Hegde, J.
- Opinions
- The judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. No separate opinion appears in the file.
Questions on this case
4 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:
Question 1 · Legal Maxims & Jurisprudence Practice Set 1
"Nemo judex in causa sua" means:
- A. Ignorance of law is no excuse
- B. No one should be a judge in their own cause
- C. The king can do no wrong
- D. Delegated power cannot be further delegated
Show the answer
B. No one should be a judge in their own cause
Nemo judex in causa sua means no one should be a judge in his own cause; it is the rule against bias in natural justice. A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) applied it to a selection board on which a candidate sat.