Law Maker

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab

Supreme Court of India · 9 May 1980 · 5 judges · 1982 AIR 1325; 1983 SCR (1) 145; 1982 SCC (3) 24

By 4:1, the Court upheld the death penalty for murder under Section 302 IPC and the sentencing procedure in Section 354(3) CrPC, holding that death may be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases.

Facts

Bachan Singh was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge; the High Court confirmed the sentence. His appeal by special leave, heard by Sarkaria and Kailasam, JJ., raised only whether the facts found were 'special reasons' for a death sentence under Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, his counsel relying on Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. Kailasam, J. considered that decision contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., and the case was sent to the Chief Justice for a larger bench. Meanwhile several persons sentenced to death filed writ petitions under Article 32 challenging the death penalty for murder and Section 354(3). On the Solicitor General's concession, the five Judge Bench heard the constitutional questions afresh.

Questions before the Court

  1. Is the death penalty provided for murder in Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code unconstitutional under Articles 14, 19 and 21?
  2. Is the sentencing procedure in Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 unconstitutional because it gives the Court unguided discretion and allows death sentences to be imposed arbitrarily or freakishly?
  3. Can the Court lay down standards or norms restricting the death penalty to a narrow category of murders?

What the Court held

  • Section 302 IPC does not have to stand the test of Article 19(1): penal laws in pith and substance do not deal with those rights, and loss of freedom after conviction is not a direct and inevitable effect of the penal law. Even if tested, Section 302 violates neither the letter nor the ethos of Article 19.
  • Read with Maneka Gandhi, Article 21 recognises that the State may deprive a person of life by fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. The Constitution itself contemplates death sentences, so the death penalty for murder is not unreasonable, cruel or unusual and does not violate the basic structure.
  • Section 354(3) is valid. The sentencing discretion is exercised judicially on well-recognised principles, within the legislative policy of Section 354(3), and is subject to correction by superior courts; it is neither unguided nor a delegation of legislative power. Jagmohan was re-affirmed, and the provisions do not violate Articles 14, 19 and 21.
  • Under Sections 354(3) and 235(2), life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception; 'special reasons' means exceptional reasons. The Court must weigh the circumstances of both the crime and the criminal, rejecting Rajendra Prasad's view that special reasons relate only to the criminal or only to threats to the security of State and society.
  • Exhaustive standardisation of sentencing is neither practicable nor desirable, but broad guidelines can be given. The Court indicated aggravating and mitigating circumstances, said mitigating factors must receive a liberal and expansive construction, and held that death should be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.

Why it matters

The majority upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty for murder and of Section 354(3) of the 1973 Code, re-affirming Jagmohan in the light of that Code. It read Sections 354(3) and 235(2) as making life imprisonment the rule and death the exception, required courts to consider both the crime and the criminal, indicated aggravating and mitigating circumstances as broad guidelines rather than rigid standards, and confined the death sentence to the rarest of rare cases.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“On this latter aspect of the matter, we are of the opinion that the deprivation of freedom consequent upon an order of conviction and sentence is not a direct and inevitable consequence of the penal law but is merely incidental to the order of conviction and sentence which may or may not come into play, that is to say, which may or may not be passed. Considering therefore the test formulated by us in its dual aspect, we are of the opinion that Section 302 of the Penal Code does not have to stand the test of Article 19(1) of the Constitution.”
Sarkaria, J.Page 36 of the judgment
“The expression "special reasons" in the context of this provision, obviously means "exceptional reasons" founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime as well as the criminal. Thus, the legislative policy now writ large and clear on the face of Section 354(3) is that on conviction for murder and other capital offences punishable in the alternative with death under the Penal Code, the extreme penalty should be imposed only in extreme cases.”
Sarkaria, J.Page 65 of the judgment
“The exercise of this sentencing discretion cannot be said to be untrammelled and unguided. It is exercised judicially in accordance with well-recognised principles crystalised by judicial decisions, directed along the broad contours of legislative policy towards the signposts enacted in Section 354(3).”
Sarkaria, J.Page 67 of the judgment
“It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along the highroad of legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3), viz, that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.”
Sarkaria, J.Page 78 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Related judgments

Case and bench

Parties
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
Case
Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979 (with Writ Petitions Nos. 564, 165, 179, 168, 434, 89, 754, 756 and 976 of 1979 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1732 of 1979)
Decided
9 May 1980
Bench
Chandrachud, Y.V. (CJ), Bhagwati, P.N., Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh, Gupta, A.C., Untwalia, N.L.
Opinions
Majority 4:1. Sarkaria, J. delivered the majority judgment. Bhagwati, J. delivered a separate judgment, which he describes as a solitary dissent, holding the death penalty in Section 302 IPC read with Section 354(3) CrPC void as violating Articles 14 and 21.

Questions on this case

2 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:

  1. Question 1 · Landmark Judgments Practice Set 1

    In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980), the Constitution Bench:

    1. A. struck down the death penalty for murder as violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21
    2. B. upheld the death penalty for murder but made it mandatory for murder by a life convict
    3. C. held death to be the normal sentence for murder and life imprisonment the exception
    4. D. upheld the death penalty for murder, to be imposed only in the 'rarest of rare' cases
    Show the answer

    D. upheld the death penalty for murder, to be imposed only in the 'rarest of rare' cases

    The majority rejected the challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty in Section 302 IPC and the sentencing procedure in Section 354(3) CrPC, holding that life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception, to be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.