Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Supreme Court of India · 29 September 1955 · 5 judges · 1955 AIR 781, 1955 SCR (2) 589
A pre-Constitution law that became void under Article 13(1) for inconsistency with Article 19(1)(g) was only eclipsed, not dead, and revived against citizens once the First Amendment amended Article 19(6) to remove the inconsistency.
Facts
The petitioners were stage carriage operators in Madhya Pradesh under permits granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 1948) gave the Provincial Government wide powers, including power to cancel permits and to take up the motor transport business itself to the exclusion of private operators. The Act was valid when passed. On 4 February 1955 a notification declared the Government's intention to take up certain routes. The petitioners, relying on Shagir Ahmad v. State of U.P., contended under Article 32 that the Act became void under Article 13(1) when the Constitution came into force and could not be revived by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 or the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 without re-enactment.
Questions before the Court
- Whether a pre-Constitution law that became void under Article 13(1) for inconsistency with Article 19(1)(g) is revived when a constitutional amendment removes the inconsistency.
- Whether the impugned Act could still be challenged under Article 31(2) after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.
What the Court held
- Following Keshavan Madhava Menon, 'void' in Article 13(1) means void only to the extent of inconsistency with fundamental rights. The existing law continued to govern past transactions and to apply to non-citizens; it was not wiped out of the statute book.
- The impugned law was eclipsed for the time being by the fundamental right. The First Amendment, by amending Article 19(6) to permit State monopolies, removed the shadow, and the Act became enforceable against citizens from 18 June 1951.
- As amended Article 19(6) was not retrospective, the Act could not operate against citizens between 26 January 1950 and 18 June 1951. The 1955 notification was valid.
- On the same reasoning, the Fourth Amendment removed the inconsistency with Article 31(2) from 27 April 1955, and petitions filed after that date could not succeed on that ground. The petitions were dismissed.
Why it matters
The judgment states the doctrine of eclipse: a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with a fundamental right is not dead but overshadowed, remaining operative for past transactions and against non-citizens, and becomes fully operative once a constitutional amendment removes the inconsistency. It distinguishes Shagir Ahmad, where the effect of the amended Article 19(6) was not raised, and holds American authorities on unconstitutional laws inapplicable under Article 13.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“Therefore, between the 26th January 1950 and the 18th June 1951 the impugned Act could not stand in the way of the exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen under article 190(1) (g). The true position,is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 was to remove I the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity.”
“Such 'laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution tights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens. It is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition. In our judgment, after the amendment of clause (6) of article 19 on the 18th June 1951, the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens.”
“As explained in Keshavan Madhava Menon's. case (supra) the law became void not in toto or for all purposes or for all times or for all persons but only "to the extent of such inconsiatency", that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the provisions of Part III which conferred the fundamental rights on the citizens.”
Provisions interpreted
- Article 13(1), Constitution
- Article 19(1)(g) and 19(6), Constitution
- Article 31(2), Constitution (as amended in 1955)
- C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 1948)
Case and bench
- Parties
- Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another
- Case
- Petitions Nos. 189 to 193 of 1955 (Original Jurisdiction)
- Decided
- 29 September 1955
- Bench
- Sudhi Ranjan Das (Acting CJ), Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, Syed Jaffer Imam, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar
- Opinions
- Unanimous. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Das, Acting C.J.
Questions on this case
4 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:
Question 1 · Interpretation of Statutes Practice Set 2 — Aids & Doctrines
The doctrine of 'eclipse' applies to a pre-Constitution law that is inconsistent with Fundamental Rights, meaning the law is:
- A. Permanently void from the outset
- B. Not dead but remains dormant/eclipsed, and can revive if the inconsistency is removed
- C. Automatically amended by the courts
- D. Applicable only to Union laws
Show the answer
B. Not dead but remains dormant/eclipsed, and can revive if the inconsistency is removed
Under Article 13(1), a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights is not wiped out but eclipsed; it remains in force for pre-Constitution matters and revives if the inconsistency is removed by constitutional amendment (Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., 1955).