Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab

Supreme Court of India · 15 January 2010 · 2 judges

The appellant, who fired at his uncle after the uncle struck his father on the head with a gandasa and advanced on him, acted in private defence; the High Court wrongly reversed his acquittal.

Facts

The dispute arose within a family over partition of land near a common well. The prosecution said the appellant and his father came armed to the complainant's field, the father struck the appellant's uncle with a gandasa, and the appellant fired two shots from his licensed gun, killing the uncle. The accused admitted the firing but pleaded that the uncle first struck the father on the head with a gandasa, causing a bone deep wound, and then advanced on the appellant, who fired in self defence. The Sessions Court acquitted both, finding the defence version more probable: the incident occurred in the accused's field, the eye witnesses' injuries were doubtful, and the deceased had the motive to attack. The High Court reversed the acquittal. The father died while the appeal was pending and his appeal abated.

Questions before the Court

Whether the appellant's act of shooting the deceased was protected by the right of private defence under Sections 96 to 100 IPC.
Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's judgment of acquittal.

What the Court held

Under Section 100 IPC the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death where the assault causes a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Whether the apprehension was reasonable is a question of fact, judged by the weapon, the manner of assault and the surrounding circumstances.
The right is available only to one suddenly confronted with an impending danger not of his own creation. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough; it begins when the apprehension arises and lasts as long as it lasts. It is a right to defend, not to retaliate.
A person under assault is not expected to modulate his defence step by step with arithmetical exactitude, but the force used must not be wholly disproportionate. The accused need not prove the right beyond reasonable doubt, and the plea may be considered even if not raised, if it arises from the record.
An appellate court should not reverse an acquittal merely because the complainant's version seems more truthful. If the trial court's view is possible or plausible it should not interfere, unless that view is perverse and no other view is possible.
The appellant had a serious apprehension of death or at least grievous hurt when he fired. The High Court's judgment was set aside, the acquittal restored and the appellant acquitted.

Why it matters

The judgment collects the authorities on private defence and sets out ten principles in paragraph 58: the right arises on a reasonable apprehension, lasts as long as the apprehension, is not available against danger of one's own making, need not be exercised with arithmetical exactitude, must not be wholly disproportionate, and need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It also restates the limits on an appellate court reversing an acquittal.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“(ii) The right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an impending danger and not of self-creation. (iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self defence into operation. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence.”

Dalveer Bhandari, J.Page 36 of the judgment

“The law does not require a law-abiding citizen to behave like a coward when confronted with an imminent unlawful aggression. As repeatedly observed by this court there is nothing more degrading to the human spirit than to run away in face of danger. The right of private defence is thus designed to serve a social purpose and deserves to be fostered within the prescribed limits.”

Dalveer Bhandari, J.Page 20 of the judgment

“In a case of acquittal, if the trial court's view is a possible or plausible view, then the Appellate Court or the High Court would not be justified in interfering with it. It is the settled legal position that there is presumption of innocence and that presumption is further fortified with the acquittal of the accused by the trial court.”

Dalveer Bhandari, J.Page 39 of the judgment

“In the facts and circumstances of this case the appellant, Darshan Singh had the serious apprehension of death or at least the grievous hurt when he exercised his right of private defence to save himself.”

Dalveer Bhandari, J.Page 26 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Section 96, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 34 (NCRB correspondence table)
Section 97, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 35 (NCRB correspondence table)
Section 99, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 37 (NCRB correspondence table)
Section 100, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 38 (NCRB correspondence table)

Case and bench

Parties: Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 1057 of 2002
Decided: 15 January 2010
Bench: Dalveer Bhandari, Asok Kumar Ganguly
Opinions: Unanimous. Judgment delivered by Dalveer Bhandari, J.

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