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Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani

Supreme Court of India · 7 April 1978 · 3 judges · 1978 AIR 1025; 1978 SCR (3) 608; 1978 SCC (2) 424

The Court held that Article 20(3) and Section 161(2) CrPC protect an accused during police interrogation, cover exposure to other pending or imminent charges, and bar psychologically compelled answers; the Section 179 IPC prosecution was quashed.

Facts

The appellant, a former Chief Minister of Orissa, was named with others in a first information report registered by the Vigilance police under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the IPC, alleging acquisition of assets disproportionate to her known sources of income. She was directed to appear at the Vigilance police station and was given a long list of written questions. She declined to answer. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, filed a complaint under Section 179 IPC for refusing to answer a public servant, and the Magistrate took cognizance. She challenged the proceedings in the Orissa High Court under Article 226 and Section 401 CrPC, relying on Article 20(3) and Section 161(2) CrPC. The High Court dismissed her challenge and she appealed on a certificate.

Questions before the Court

  1. Does Article 20(3) apply at the stage of police interrogation, and does 'any person' in Section 161 CrPC include an accused person?
  2. Does the right to silence extend to answers that would expose the accused to other pending or imminent charges outside the case under investigation?
  3. What amounts to being 'compelled' to be a witness against oneself under Article 20(3)?
  4. Was the prosecution under Section 179 IPC for refusing to answer sustainable?

What the Court held

  • Section 161 CrPC enables the police to examine an accused during investigation; 'any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts' includes an accused. Article 20(3) applies from the stage of police interrogation, not only in court, and covers substantially the same area as Section 161(2).
  • The right to silence protects the accused not only in the case under investigation but also in regard to other offences pending or imminent. A question tends to incriminate when a relevant answer is loaded with guilty inference; fanciful apprehensions do not justify refusal, and the court judges the matter objectively.
  • 'Compelled testimony' includes evidence obtained by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring or intimidatory interrogation, but not the legal penalty for refusing to answer. Section 179 IPC requires mens rea, and innocent refusal is not an offence.
  • Police should permit an accused's lawyer to be present during interrogation if the accused so wishes, though they need not provide one, and must warn the accused of the right to silence and record it.
  • In the circumstances the prosecution was quashed, on the appellant's undertaking to answer all questions that did not materially incriminate her, and the appeals were allowed.

Why it matters

The judgment extends Article 20(3) to police interrogation, reads Section 161(2) CrPC with it, and gives 'compulsion' a wide meaning that covers psychological and environmental pressure. It recognises that the right to silence covers exposure to other pending or imminent accusations, and lays down practical safeguards for questioning, including access to a lawyer during interrogation and a warning about the right to silence.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“We hold that section 161 enables the police to examine the accused during investigation. The prohibitive sweep of Art. 20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation-not, as contended, commencing in court only.”
Krishna Iyer, J.Page 37 of the judgment
“The ban on self-accusation and the right to silence, while one investigation or trial is- under way, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or imminent, which may deter him from voluntary disclosure of criminatory matter. We are disposed to read 'compelled testimony' as evidence procured not merely by physical threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like-not legal penalty for violation.”
Krishna Iyer, J.Page 37 of the judgment
“We think that Art. 20 (3) and Art. 22(1) may, in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the Police to permit the advocate of the accused, if there be one, to be present at the time be is examined. Over-reaching Art. 20(3) and section 161(2) will be obviated by this requirement. We do not lay down that the Police must secure the services of a lawyer.”
Krishna Iyer, J.Page 38 of the judgment
“We hold that 'any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case' includes an accused person who fills that role because the police suppose him to have committed the crime and must, therefore, be familiar with the facts.”
Krishna Iyer, J.Page 27 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Related judgments

Case and bench

Parties
Nandini Satpathy v. Dani (P.L.) and Anr.
Case
Civil Appeal No. 315 of 1978 and Criminal Appeal No. 101 of 1978
Decided
7 April 1978
Bench
Krishnaiyer, V.R., Singh, Jaswant, Tulzapurkar, V.D.
Opinions
Unanimous. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J.

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