Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India

Supreme Court of India · 21 March 1990 · 2 judges · 1991 AIR 45; 1990 SCR (2) 63; 1990 SCC (2) 409

Overruled in whole or in part by Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020), which says: “The judgment in Kanhaiyalal (supra) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (supra) in paragraphs 44 and 45. For the reasons stated by us hereinabove, both these judgments do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled by us.”

Officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence invested with police station officer powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are not 'police officers' under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, so confessions made to them are not barred.

Facts

On 12 July 1986, DRI officials intercepted a truck near Calcutta and recovered about 743 kg of hashish concealed in machines meant for export; further quantities were found at a farm house in Mehrauli, New Delhi. In the investigation the names of Kirpal Mohan Virmani and Raj Kumar Karwal surfaced, and both made confessional statements to DRI officials. Complaints were filed against them under Sections 21, 23, 29 and 30 of the NDPS Act and Section 135A of the Customs Act, 1962. When they applied for bail, the prosecution relied on their statements. They argued that the statements were barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, on a reference, held that DRI officers invested with powers under Section 53 were not police officers, and that the statements were not hit by Section 25. The accused appealed.

Questions before the Court

Are officers of the DRI invested with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station under Section 53 of the NDPS Act 'police officers' within Section 25 of the Evidence Act?
Is a confessional statement recorded by such an officer during investigation of an NDPS offence admissible against the accused?

What the Court held

Section 25 of the Evidence Act is a wholesome protection and must be read in a broad and popular sense, not a narrow technical one, but it cannot be stretched to treat as police officers persons on whom only some police powers are conferred.
Following Badku Joti Savant and later cases, an officer given powers like those of an officer-in-charge of a police station under a special law is not a police officer under Section 25 unless he can submit a report under Section 173 of the Code, which is the important attribute of police power.
Nothing in the NDPS Act vests Section 53 officers with all the powers under Chapter XII of the Code. Section 36A(1)(d) shows that a police investigation ends in a police report, while an investigation by an officer of another department such as the DRI ends in a complaint by an authorised officer.
A confessional statement made by a person accused under the NDPS Act to a DRI officer invested with powers under Section 53 is not hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The appeal and the special leave petition were dismissed.

Why it matters

The judgment applies the test from the Customs and Railway Property cases to the NDPS Act: the clinching attribute of a 'police officer' under Section 25 of the Evidence Act is the power to file a report under Section 173 of the Code. It relies on Section 36A(1)(d) to hold that non-police officers investigating under Section 53 proceed by complaint, so confessions made to them are not excluded by Section 25.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“We, therefore, agree that as Section 25. Evidence Act, engrafts a wholesome protection it must not be construed in a narrow and technical sense but must be understood in a broad and popular sense. But at the same time it cannot be construed in so wide a sense as to include persons on whom only some of the powers exercised by the police are conferred within the category of police officers.”

Ahmadi, J.Page 8 of the judgment

“The nomenclature is not important, the content of the power he exercises is the determinative factor. The important attribute of police power is not only the power to investigate into the commission of cognizable offence but also the power to prosecute the offender by filing a report or a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code.”

Ahmadi, J.Page 15 of the judgment

“This clause makes it clear that if the investigation is conducted by the police, it would conclude in a police report but if the investigation is made by an officer of any other department including the DRI, the Special Court would take cognizance of the offence upon a formal complaint made by such authorised officer of the concerned Government.”

Ahmadi, J.Page 15 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Section 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Now: BSA 23(1) (NCRB correspondence table)
Section 53, NDPS Act, 1985
Section 36A(1)(d), NDPS Act, 1985
Sections 52 and 52A, NDPS Act, 1985
Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Now: BNSS 193(8) (NCRB correspondence table)

Related judgments

Followed in Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India (2008)

Case and bench

Parties: Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, with Kirpal Mohan Virmani v. State
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 449 of 1989, with Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 55 of 1988
Decided: 21 March 1990
Bench: Ahmadi, A.M. (J), Fathima Beevi, M. (J)
Opinions: Unanimous. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Ahmadi, J.