Shreya Singhal v. Union of India
Supreme Court of India · 24 March 2015 · 2 judges
The Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act as violating Article 19(1)(a), upheld Section 69A and the blocking rules, and read down Section 79(3)(b).
Facts
A batch of writ petitions under Article 32 challenged Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, inserted by an amendment of 2009 with effect from 27 October 2009, which punished sending by a computer resource or communication device information that is grossly offensive or menacing, or known to be false and sent to cause annoyance, inconvenience, insult, ill will and the like. The petitioners argued that it curbed free speech on grounds outside Article 19(2), was vague, had a chilling effect and violated Article 14; they said many innocent persons had been booked under it. The Union defended it, relying on the presumption of constitutionality and offering to read it down. The petitions also challenged Section 69A and the 2009 blocking rules, Section 79 and the Intermediary Guidelines Rules, 2011, and Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act.
Questions before the Court
- Does Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 violate Article 19(1)(a), and is it saved by Article 19(2)?
- Is Section 66A void for vagueness and overbreadth, and can any part of it be severed?
- Does Section 66A violate Article 14 by treating speech on the internet differently?
- Are Section 69A with the 2009 blocking rules, Section 79 with the 2011 Intermediary Guidelines Rules, and Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act valid?
What the Court held
- Section 66A directly curbs speech and is not saved by Article 19(2). It has no proximate relation to public order, as it requires no tendency to disrupt public order; it is not aimed at defamation, since injury to reputation is not an ingredient; and annoyance or inconvenience is not incitement to an offence or within decency or morality.
- The expressions used in Section 66A are undefined and nebulous, so the section is unconstitutionally vague. It sweeps in protected and innocent speech and is struck down for overbreadth and its chilling effect. An assurance that it will be administered reasonably cannot save an invalid law.
- Since Section 66A can be applied for purposes outside Article 19(2), no part of it is severable and it is struck down in its entirety. The Article 14 challenge fails, as there is an intelligible differentia between speech on the internet and other media.
- Section 69A and the 2009 blocking rules are valid: blocking is narrowly confined to Article 19(2) subjects, needs a reasoned order and a hearing. The absence of safeguards like those in Sections 95 and 96 CrPC does not make the rules invalid.
- Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(4) of the 2011 Rules are read down: an intermediary loses its exemption only if it fails to remove material after actual knowledge from a court order, or notification by the Government, relatable to Article 19(2).
- Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act is within State legislative competence but suffers from the same vagueness and overbreadth as Section 66A and is struck down under Article 19(1)(a).
Why it matters
The Court distinguished discussion and advocacy, which Article 19(1)(a) protects, from incitement, which Article 19(2) may restrict, and applied vagueness, overbreadth and chilling effect as grounds to invalidate a penal law on speech. Following Romesh Thappar, it held that a speech restriction capable of application outside Article 19(2) fails as a whole. It also read down Section 79(3)(b): an intermediary loses its exemption only on actual knowledge from a court order or government notification relatable to Article 19(2).
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“We have already held that Section 66A creates an offence which is vague and overbroad, and, therefore, unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article 19(2).”
“Further, the Section does not require that such message should have a clear tendency to disrupt public order. Such message need not have any potential which could disturb the community at large.”
“Such is the reach of the Section and if it is to withstand the test of constitutionality, the chilling effect on free speech would be total.”
“Also, the Court order and/or the notification by the appropriate Government or its agency must strictly conform to the subject matters laid down in Article 19(2).”
Provisions interpreted
- Section 66A, Information Technology Act, 2000
- Section 69A, Information Technology Act, 2000
- Section 79, Information Technology Act, 2000
- Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2), Constitution
- Article 14, Constitution
- Section 118(d), Kerala Police Act
- Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011, Rule 3(4)
Related judgments
- Follows Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950)“Romesh Thappar's judgment would apply on all fours.” (page 97)
- Follows Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1950)“Ultimately, applying the tests referred to in Chintaman Rao and V.G. Row's case, referred to earlier in the judgment,” (page 87)
Case and bench
- Parties
- Shreya Singhal v. Union of India
- Case
- Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012 etc.
- Decided
- 24 March 2015
- Bench
- J. Chelameswar, J., R. F. Nariman, J.
- Opinions
- Unanimous. The judgment of the Court was delivered by R. F. Nariman, J.
Questions on this case
6 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:
Question 1 · Landmark Judgments Practice Set 1
In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), which provision of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was struck down in its entirety as violative of Article 19(1)(a)?
- A. Section 66A
- B. Section 79
- C. Section 43A
- D. Section 69A
Show the answer
A. Section 66A
The Court struck down Section 66A in its entirety as violating Article 19(1)(a) and not being saved by Article 19(2). Section 69A and the blocking rules were upheld, and Section 79 was upheld subject to Section 79(3)(b) being read down to require a court order or government notification.