State by Lokayuktha Police v. K. Rangayya
Supreme Court of India, 26 May 2026, 2 judges, 2026 INSC 574
A public servant's veiled direction to a complainant to pay his subordinates is prima facie an attempt to obtain an undue advantage for another person under Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2, PC Act; the FIR was restored.
Facts
K. Rangayya, a Police Sub-Inspector in Karnataka, seized the complainant's two-wheeler and mobile phone on an allegation of illegally selling ration rice. The complainant visited the police station repeatedly for their return. A private person allegedly demanded Rs. 50,000 on the Sub-Inspector's instructions. When the vehicle was released, the Sub-Inspector allegedly told the complainant to 'do something' for the other police officials, after which a constable demanded Rs. 5,000, later reduced to Rs. 3,000. The Lokayukta Police registered an FIR under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the trap the Sub-Inspector was absent and the money was recovered from another person. The Karnataka High Court quashed the FIR against him, holding that neither demand nor acceptance by him was made out. The State appealed.
Questions before the Court
- Whether the High Court exceeded the limits of its quashing jurisdiction by examining the trap proceedings, recovery and departmental findings.
- Whether an FIR alleging that a public servant directed the complainant to pay his subordinates discloses an offence under Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2 of the PC Act though he made no direct demand and received nothing.
- Whether judgments on demand and acceptance rendered after trial, a departmental enquiry exonerating co-accused, or alleged mala fides justified quashing.
What the Court held
- At the quashing stage the only inquiry is whether the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. By weighing the trap outcome, absence of personal recovery, the phenolphthalein test and a departmental enquiry, the High Court conducted an impermissible mini-trial.
- Under Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2, the undue advantage may be obtained, accepted or attempted to be obtained for another person, directly or through a third party, and through another public servant. A public servant who stays in the background may still commit the offence.
- An attempt includes mere solicitation, implicit or explicit, and actual exchange of a bribe is not essential. The direction to 'do something' for the other police officials was a veiled demand and prima facie an attempt to obtain an undue advantage for another person.
- K. Shanthamma, Soundarajan and Jagtar Singh were decided after trial on the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and do not apply at the pre-trial quashing stage.
- Exoneration of co-accused in a departmental enquiry does not exonerate the principal accused, and alleged mala fides is a matter for trial. The appeal was allowed and the FIR restored, without any bearing on the merits at trial.
Why it matters
The judgment reads Section 7(a) of the PC Act with Explanation 2 to hold that a public servant who directs that a bribe be paid to subordinates, without demanding or receiving anything himself, may be prosecuted for an attempt to obtain an undue advantage for another person. It warns that a contrary reading would let senior officials collect bribes through subordinates while keeping personal deniability, and it confines post-trial rulings on proof of demand to the trial stage.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“The Respondent No. 1’s implicit yet unmistakable direction to the Complainant to provide illegal gratification to his subordinate police officials as disclosed in the records thus falls squarely within the scope of “attempt to obtain” an “undue advantage” “for another person,” as contemplated by Explanation 2(i) to Section 7 of the PC Act. The fact that the Respondent No. 1 may not personally have received or even intended to receive any part of the illegal gratification is entirely immaterial to the establishment of the offence at the stage of prima facie inquiry, by reason of the express statutory language of Explanation 2 to Section 7 of the PC Act.”
“The interpretation adopted by the High Court, if permitted to stand, would limit the broad scope of Section 7 read with Explanation 2, and would create a pernicious loophole in the anti-corruption law by permitting senior public officials to orchestrate and direct the collection of illegal gratification through their public servant subordinates and park the benefits in the account of the “another person” for whose benefit the public servant intends, while maintaining personal deniability. Such a construction would subvert the manifest purpose and policy of the PC Act and render the Explanation 2 redundant, and thus, cannot be countenanced.”
“The present case, on the other hand, is at the pre-trial stage, when no evidence has been led, no witnesses have been examined, and charge sheet has not been evaluated. The principles and standards articulated in post-trial judgments cannot be transplanted to the pre-trial stage of considering the quashing of an FIR.”
“The sole and limited inquiry at this threshold stage is whether the allegations set out in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety as true, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence against the accused.”
Provisions interpreted
Case and bench
- Parties
- The State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 5245 of 2025)
- Decided
- 26 May 2026
- Bench
- Sanjay Karol, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
- Opinions
- Unanimous. Judgment of the Court delivered by Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.