Law Maker

Union of India v. V. Sriharan

Supreme Court of India · 2 December 2015 · 5 judges

Life imprisonment means imprisonment for the rest of the convict's life; by majority, constitutional courts may substitute death with a term beyond 14 years or whole life without remission; Section 435(1) consultation means concurrence.

Facts

Seven persons convicted for the assassination of a former Prime Minister were serving life sentences; the death sentences of three of them had been commuted by the Supreme Court in 2014. Immediately afterwards, by letter dated 19 February 2014, the Tamil Nadu Government told the Union Government that it proposed to remit their sentences and release them. The Union of India challenged the proposal by a writ petition under Article 32. A three-judge Bench referred seven questions to a Constitution Bench, concerning the meaning of life imprisonment, the power of courts to fix sentences beyond remission, the relation between Sections 432 to 435 CrPC and Articles 72 and 161, the identity of the 'appropriate Government', suo motu remission, and whether 'consultation' in Section 435(1) means 'concurrence'.

Questions before the Court

  1. Does imprisonment for life mean imprisonment for the rest of the convict's life, and can a court, as an alternative to death, impose a special category of sentence beyond 14 years and put it beyond remission?
  2. Can the appropriate Government exercise remission powers under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC after the President or Governor has acted under Article 72 or 161, or this Court under Article 32?
  3. Which Government is the 'appropriate Government' under Section 432(7) CrPC, and may remission under Section 432(1) be granted suo motu?
  4. Does 'consultation' with the Central Government in Section 435(1) CrPC mean 'concurrence'?

What the Court held

  • The writ petition by the Union of India was maintainable. Imprisonment for life under Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC means imprisonment for the rest of the convict's life; the constitutional remedies of remission, commutation and reprieve under Articles 72 and 161 always remain available.
  • By majority, the ratio of Swamy Shraddananda (2) is well founded: as an alternative to death, a special category of sentence for the whole of life or a term exceeding 14 years, beyond remission, may be imposed, but only by the High Court and, on appeal, the Supreme Court. Sangeet v. State of Haryana was overruled on this point.
  • The appropriate Government may exercise its powers under Sections 432 and 433 even after the President or Governor has acted under Article 72 or 161. Those statutory powers belong to the appropriate Government and are not for this Court to exercise under Article 32.
  • Where specific executive power is conferred on the Centre by a law of Parliament or the Constitution, the Union is the appropriate Government under Section 432(7)(a), even if the State can legislate on the subject; otherwise the State within whose territory the sentence was passed is the appropriate Government.
  • No suo motu remission is permissible under Section 432(1); it can be initiated only on the convict's application under Section 432(2) and is guided by the opinion of the presiding judge of the convicting court.
  • In cases falling under clauses (a) to (c) of Section 435(1), the Central Government has primacy, and 'consultation' with it in reality means 'concurrence'.

Why it matters

The judgment settles that a life sentence means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's life and, by majority, upholds the power of constitutional courts to fix a term beyond 14 years or whole life without remission as an alternative to death, overruling Sangeet on this point. It also lays down the scheme of remission under Sections 432 to 435 CrPC, including the bar on suo motu remission and the need for the Centre's concurrence in Section 435(1) cases.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“We, therefore, reiterate that, the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other Court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict’s life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior Court.”
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.Page 105 of the judgment
“We hold that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) that a special category of sentence; instead of death can be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well-founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative.”
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.Page 176 of the judgment
“The exercise of power under Sections 432 and 433 of Code of Criminal Procedure will be available to the Appropriate Government even if such consideration was made earlier and exercised under Article 72 by the President or under Article 161 by the Governor. As far as the application of Article 32 of the Constitution by this Court is concerned, it is held that the powers under Sections 432 and 433 are to be exercised by the Appropriate Government statutorily and it is not for this Court to exercise the said power and it is always left to be decided by the Appropriate Government.”
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.Page 176 of the judgment
“No suo motu power of remission is exercisable under Section 432(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure It can only be initiated based on an application of the person convicted as provided under Section 432 (2) and that ultimate order of suspension or remission should be guided by the opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Officer of the concerned Court.”
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.Page 178 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Case and bench

Parties
Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan
Case
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014, with Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos. 185, 150 and 66 of 2014 and Criminal Appeal No. 1215 of 2011
Decided
2 December 2015
Bench
H.L. Dattu, Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Abhay Manohar Sapre, Uday Umesh Lalit
Opinions
Majority 3:2 on Question 52.1(b). Majority opinion by Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J., signed by H.L. Dattu, CJI and Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. Uday Umesh Lalit, J. (with Abhay Manohar Sapre, J., who also wrote a short concurrence with Lalit, J.) disagreed on Question 52.1(b) and stated that their conclusions on the other questions conform to the majority's.

Questions on this case

3 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:

  1. Question 1 · Legal Current Affairs: July 2026

    In Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (29 July 2026), convicts challenged, under Article 32, sentences directing that they would not be released for the remainder of their natural lives. The Supreme Court:

    1. A. dismissed the petitions, relying on the Constitution Bench ruling in Union of India v. V. Sriharan
    2. B. declared such sentences void for taking away the State's power of remission under Section 432 CrPC
    3. C. allowed the petitions and directed the State to consider each of the convicts for premature release within four weeks
    4. D. referred the validity of such sentences to a Constitution Bench of five Judges for an authoritative and final ruling
    Show the answer

    A. dismissed the petitions, relying on the Constitution Bench ruling in Union of India v. V. Sriharan

    Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih, JJ. (2026 INSC 764) held that the five-Judge Bench in V. Sriharan had upheld sentences for the remainder of natural life without remission, and called the challenge a misuse of process. Petitioners who had not sought remission were left to their statutory and constitutional remedies; petitions against Presidential orders were also dismissed.

  2. Question 2 · Legal Current Affairs: September 2026

    Which of the following correctly states the ruling of the Supreme Court in Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, decided on 24 September 2026?

    1. A. A Sessions Court may direct a murder convict to remain in prison for the rest of his life if it records special reasons
    2. B. A Sessions Court cannot impose a special category sentence barring remission; only the High Court and Supreme Court can
    3. C. Only the Supreme Court, and not a High Court, may impose a fixed term of imprisonment that wholly excludes remission
    4. D. Life imprisonment means imprisonment for fourteen years unless the State Government orders a longer term
    Show the answer

    B. A Sessions Court cannot impose a special category sentence barring remission; only the High Court and Supreme Court can

    Relying on Swamy Shraddananda (2) and Union of India v. V. Sriharan, the Court (2026 INSC 1048) held the trial court was not competent to direct that the convicts remain in prison till the rest of their life, as special category sentences can be imposed only by the High Court and the Supreme Court. Life imprisonment is not a fixed fourteen-year term.