Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration

Supreme Court of India · 29 April 1980 · 3 judges · 1980 AIR 1535; 1980 SCR (3) 855; 1980 SCC (3) 526

Routine handcuffing of under-trial prisoners violates Articles 14, 19 and 21; handcuffs may be used only where there is no other reasonable way to prevent escape, with recorded reasons and judicial oversight, and the 'better class' distinction is arbitrary.

Facts

The petitioner, an under-trial prisoner in Tihar Jail classified as a 'better class' prisoner, sent a telegram to a Judge of the Supreme Court complaining that he and others were handcuffed while being taken to Delhi courts for trial, despite court directions. The trial judge had directed that he be handcuffed only if warranted by the rules applicable to better class prisoners, but he was handcuffed under superior police orders, including on 6 October 1979. The Delhi Administration relied on the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955, whose Section 9(2)(e) empowers rules on escort, and on the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, under which persons accused of non-bailable offences punishable with more than three years' imprisonment and other listed categories were to be handcuffed, while better class prisoners were handcuffed only when necessary. The telegram was treated as a habeas corpus petition under Article 32 and an amicus curiae was appointed.

Questions before the Court

Is the routine handcuffing of under-trial prisoners in transit between jail and court consistent with Articles 14, 19 and 21?
Are paragraphs 26.21A and 26.22 of the Punjab Police Rules, which tie handcuffing to the offence charged and distinguish 'better class' from ordinary prisoners, valid?
What safeguards must accompany handcuffing in the exceptional cases where it is permitted?

What the Court held

Handcuffing is prima facie inhuman, unreasonable and arbitrary. Handcuffs or fetters shall not ordinarily be put on an under-trial prisoner; they are permissible only where there is no other reasonable way of preventing escape, such as more guards or armed escorts, and must be the last refuge, not the routine regimen.
There must be a well-grounded basis, from recorded antecedents, for a strong inference that the prisoner is likely to escape. The gravity of the charge, vague surmises or superior orders do not suffice, and the onus is on the person who puts the prisoner in irons.
Classifying prisoners into 'better class' and ordinary for handcuffing is arbitrary and irrational under Article 14. Paragraph 26.22, requiring routine handcuffing of those accused of non-bailable offences punishable with more than three years, and clauses (b) and (c), violate Articles 14, 19 and 21; other clauses must be read down.
Where handcuffs are used, the escort must record reasons contemporaneously, show them to the presiding Judge and obtain approval; otherwise the procedure is unfair under Article 21. Once the court directs removal, no escorting authority can overrule it, and the judicial officer must ask the prisoner whether he was handcuffed.
The petition was allowed and the handcuffs on the petitioner were dropped.

Why it matters

Applying Maneka Gandhi and Sunil Batra, the Court held that under-trial prisoners retain their rights under Articles 14, 19 and 21, and declared that freedom from handcuffs is the rule and restraint by irons the exception, subject to recorded reasons and judicial supervision. It struck down the 'better class' distinction and the offence-based handcuffing rules of the Punjab Police Rules. Pathak, J. agreed that restraint must be individually justified but would leave the primary decision to the custodial authority, with the trial court supervising.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“Even in cases where, in extreme circumstances, handcuffs have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so. Otherwise, under Art. 21 the procedure will be unfair and bad in law. Nor will mere recording the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical process mindlessly made. The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval.”

Krishna Iyer, J.Page 18 of the judgment

“Ignominy, inhumanity and affliction, implicit in chains and shackles are permissible, as not unreasonable, only if every other less cruel means is fraught with risks or beyond availability. So it is that to be consistent with Arts. 14 and 19 handcuffs must be the last refuge, not the routine regimen. If a few more guards will suffice, then no handcuffs. If a close watch by armed policemen will do, then no handcuffs. If alternative measures may be provided, then no iron bondage. This is the legal norm.”

Krishna Iyer, J.Page 17 of the judgment

“We clearly declare-and it shall be obeyed from the Inspector General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons to the escort constable and the jailwarder-that the rule regarding a prisoner in transit between prison house and court house is freedom from hand-cuffs and the exception, under conditions of judicial supervision we have indicated earlier, will be restraints with irons, to be justified before or after.”

Krishna Iyer, J.Page 20 of the judgment

“The rule, I think, should be that the authority responsible for the prisoners custody should consider the case of each prisoner individually and decide whether the prisoner is a person who having regard to his circumstances, general conduct, behaviour and character will attempt to escape or disturb the peace by becoming violent.”

Pathak, J. (concurring)Page 22 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Article 21, Constitution
Article 14, Constitution
Article 19, Constitution
Paragraphs 26.21A and 26.22, Punjab Police Rules, 1934
Section 9(2)(e), Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955
Section 49, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Pathak, J.)Now: BNSS 46 (NCRB correspondence table)

Related judgments

Follows Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)“The ratio in Maneka Gandhi’s case and Sunil Batra’s ease (supra), read in its proper light, leads us to this conclusion.” (page 18)
Follows Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978)“The ratio in Maneka Gandhi’s case and Sunil Batra’s ease (supra), read in its proper light, leads us to this conclusion.” (page 18)

Case and bench

Parties: Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration
Case: Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1979 (Original Jurisdiction, under Article 32)
Decided: 29 April 1980
Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R., Pathak, R.S., Reddy, O. Chinnappa (J)
Opinions: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J.; Chinnappa Reddy, J. wrote no separate opinion. Pathak, J. wrote a separate concurring opinion, differing on whether prior judicial approval is needed before handcuffing.

Questions on this case

3 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. Practise them with the landmark judgments questions.