Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration
Supreme Court of India · 30 August 1978 · 5 judges · 1978 AIR 1675; 1979 SCR (1) 392; 1978 SCC (4) 494
Reading down Sections 30(2) and 56 of the Prisons Act, 1894, the Court held that a prisoner under sentence of death cannot be kept in solitary confinement and that bar fetters may be imposed only on recorded, individual safety grounds.
Facts
Two prisoners in Tihar Central Jail petitioned under Article 32. Sunil Batra, sentenced to death by a Sessions Judge, had been kept in solitary confinement since his conviction, said to be under Section 30(2) of the Prisons Act, which requires a prisoner under sentence of death to be confined in a cell apart from all other prisoners under a guard. The second petitioner, a foreign national held as an undertrial and detenu, had been kept in bar fetters day and night from July 1976 until the Court's interim order of 24 February 1978. He challenged Section 56, which allows the Superintendent to confine prisoners in irons, as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21. Judges of the Court had visited the jail during the hearing.
Questions before the Court
- Does Section 30(2) of the Prisons Act authorise solitary confinement of a prisoner under sentence of death, and if so is it valid under Articles 14, 19, 20 and 21?
- Who is a 'prisoner under sentence of death' within Section 30(2)?
- Is Section 56, which permits the Superintendent to put prisoners in irons, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21?
What the Court held
- Convicts are not, by mere reason of conviction, denuded of fundamental rights; even a convict is entitled to the protection of Article 21, and the Court need not adopt a 'hands off' attitude to prison administration.
- Section 30(2) does not empower jail authorities to impose solitary confinement on a prisoner under sentence of death. Solitary confinement is a punishment that only a court can impose under Sections 73 and 74 of the Penal Code, and jail authorities cannot add to the sentence.
- A 'prisoner under sentence of death' is one whose death sentence has become final, conclusive and indefeasible. Even then, unless special circumstances exist, he must be within sight and sound of other prisoners and able to eat in their company; complete segregation is allowed only in extreme cases of necessity.
- Read down in this way, Section 30(2) does not violate Articles 14, 19, 20 or 21.
- Section 56 is valid, but bar fetters may be used only for safe custody, judged on the individual prisoner's character and propensities, not the length of sentence or gravity of crime. Reasons must be recorded intelligibly in the history ticket, the case reviewed regularly, and fetters cannot be kept on for unusually long periods.
Why it matters
The judgment establishes that prisoners retain fundamental rights subject to the restrictions inherent in lawful custody, and that courts will examine prison conditions under Articles 14, 19 and 21. It reads down Sections 30(2) and 56 of the Prisons Act instead of striking them down, applies the Maneka Gandhi requirement of a just, fair and reasonable procedure to prison measures, and sets safeguards against solitary confinement and bar fetters. Krishna Iyer, J.'s opinion also calls for prison reform and revision of jail manuals.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“In our opinion, sub-s. (2) of s. 30 does not empower the jail authorities in the garb of confining a prisoner under sentence of death, in a cell apart from all other prisoners, to impose solitary confinement on him. Even jail discipline inhibits solitary confinement as a measure of jail punishment.”
“The expression "prisoner under sentence of death" in the context of sub-s (2) of s. 30 can only mean the prisoner whose sentence of death has become final, conclusive and indefeasible which cannot be annulled or voided by any judicial or constitutional procedure.”
“Personal liberty of the person who is incarcerated is to a great extent curtailed by punitive detention. It is even curtailed in preventive detention. The liberty to move, mix, mingle, talk, share company with co-prisoners, if substantially curtailed, would be violative of article 21 unless the curtailment has the backing of law.”
“That will be a sad commentary on the prison administration and the administrators. Therefore, s. 56 does not permit the use of bar fetters for an unusually long period, day and night, and that too when the prisoner is confined in secure cells from where escape is somewhat inconceivable.”
Provisions interpreted
- Section 30(2), Prisons Act, 1894
- Section 56, Prisons Act, 1894
- Article 21, Constitution
- Article 14, Constitution
- Article 20(2), Constitution
- Article 19, Constitution
- Sections 73 and 74, Indian Penal Code, 1860Now: BNS 11 (NCRB correspondence table)
Related judgments
- Follows Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)“has been interpreted to mean in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) that the law must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive” (page 89)
- Followed in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980)
- Followed in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014)
Case and bench
- Parties
- Sunil Batra etc. v. Delhi Administration and Ors. etc.
- Case
- Writ Petition Nos. 2202 and 565 of 1977
- Decided
- 30 August 1978
- Bench
- Krishnaiyer, V.R., Chandrachud, Y.V. (CJ), Fazalali, Syed Murtaza, Shingal, P.N., Desai, D.A.
- Opinions
- Two opinions, agreeing in the result. Desai, J. delivered an opinion written in the plural ('we', referring to 'one of us, Chandrachud J.'), without naming all the Judges joining it; Krishna Iyer, J. wrote a separate opinion, endorsing Desai, J.'s conclusions and agreeing that the petitions be dismissed.
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