Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India
Supreme Court of India, 16 April 2008, 2 judges
Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 violates Article 14 insofar as it allows eviction for the landlord's bona fide need only from premises let for residential purposes; that restriction was struck down.
Facts
A plot leased in 1953 for residential use only was built upon and portions were let to tenants who ran a watch shop and a clinic. The appellant, who later bought the house, sought eviction in 1980 on grounds including her bona fide need. The Additional Rent Controller found her need bona fide but refused eviction because Section 14(1)(e) applies only to premises let for residential purposes, and the Rent Control Tribunal agreed. She then filed writ petitions, one asking that Section 14(1)(e) be declared ultra vires Article 14 for not providing eviction from non-residential premises. A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the petitions, relying on its earlier decision in H.C. Sharma v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and on this Court's decision in Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarin.
Questions before the Court
- Whether Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, by confining eviction on the ground of the landlord's bona fide requirement to premises let for residential purposes, violates Article 14.
- Whether a classification upheld when a law was enacted can become arbitrary with the passage of time and changed circumstances.
- Whether Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarin had already settled the constitutionality of Section 14(1)(e).
What the Court held
- A law that was reasonable when enacted may, with lapse of time or change of circumstances, become arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Even if its validity was upheld earlier, the Court may strike it down in later litigation if the rationale of the classification has ceased to exist.
- The classification rested on the acute shortage of accommodation and the resettlement of refugees after partition. After almost 50 years those reasons no longer exist, and the 1958 Act otherwise makes no substantial distinction between residential and non-residential premises. The latent discrimination has become pronounced, and the Court followed the ratio of Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab.
- In Amarjit Singh the plea of unconstitutionality was neither raised nor debated with any seriousness; the observation on it was not the ratio, which rested on the meaning of 'reasonably suitable residential accommodation'.
- Only the discriminatory portion was severed. Section 14(1)(e) now allows eviction where the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself or a dependent family member and he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation, and the Explanation below it becomes redundant. The appeals and writ petitions were allowed.
Why it matters
The judgment applies the principle that a classification may lose its constitutional justification over time and strikes down part of a statutory provision on that basis. It extends the landlord's ground of bona fide requirement under the Delhi Rent Control Act to premises let for non-residential purposes, reads Section 14(1)(e) in a severed form, and explains that the observation in Amarjit Singh on the constitutional question was not the ratio of that case.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter’s right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.”
“It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.”
“In our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years) has become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.”
“A careful reading of the aforementioned judgment shows that the plea of unconstitutionality of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act was neither raised nor debated with any seriousness and the observation made by the Court in that regard cannot be treated as the true ratio of the judgment, which as mentioned above, mainly rested on the interpretation of the expression "reasonably suitable residential accommodation".”
Provisions interpreted
Related judgments
- Follows Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab (1995)“we cannot uphold such arbitrary classification ignoring the ratio of Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra)” (page 21)
- Follows R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957)“we have kept in view well recognized rule that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible” (page 24)
Case and bench
- Parties
- Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India
- Case
- Civil Appeal No. 1897 of 2003 (with Civil Appeal No. 1898 of 2003 and Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2006)
- Decided
- 16 April 2008
- Bench
- B.N. Agrawal, G.S. Singhvi
- Opinions
- Unanimous. Judgment of the Court written by G.S. Singhvi, J.
Questions on this case
2 questions in live Law Maker papers mention this case. A few from free papers:
Question 1, Meghalaya Local Laws Practice Set 1
In Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (2008) the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of Article 14, the confinement of the bona fide requirement ground in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to premises let for residential purposes. Under the Meghalaya Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, the bona fide requirement ground in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 5(1):
- A. Applies to a house let for residential or non-residential purposes alike
- B. Applies only to residential houses, since the Act was modelled on the Delhi law
- C. Applies to non-residential buildings only where they are pucca structures
- D. Applies to non-residential buildings only after notification by the State Government
Show the answer
A. Applies to a house let for residential or non-residential purposes alike
Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (2008) read down Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Act so that the ground extends to non-residential premises. The Meghalaya Act has no such limitation in the first place: clause (c) applies to a "house", which Section 2(ii) defines as a building, hut or shed let for residential or non-residential purposes.