State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya
Supreme Court of India · 15 September 1976 · 2 judges · 1977 AIR 45; 1977 SCR (1) 601; 1976 SCC (4) 382
Explaining the distinction between culpable homicide under Section 299 and murder under Section 300 IPC, the Court restored the murder conviction of an accused who, with another, beat the victim's arms and legs with heavy sticks, causing death.
Facts
The deceased, a 55 year old faction leader in Rompicherla village, was going by bus to the police station when the accused, of the rival faction, alighted at the same stop. Accused 1 and 2 picked up heavy sticks, followed him into a choultry and, despite his pleas, beat his legs and arms until he was unconscious, causing 19 injuries with several fractures and dislocations. He died the next morning. The doctor who conducted the autopsy said the injuries were cumulatively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, from shock and haemorrhage. The trial court convicted both under Section 302 and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II, holding there was no intention to cause death because vital parts were avoided. The State appealed; the appeal abated as to Accused 1, who had died.
Questions before the Court
- How the courts should distinguish 'murder' under Section 300 from 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' under Section 299 IPC.
- Whether a beating deliberately confined to the arms and legs, causing injuries cumulatively sufficient to cause death, falls within clause thirdly of Section 300.
What the Court held
- Culpable homicide is the genus and murder its species. The Code recognises three degrees: murder under Section 300, culpable homicide punishable under the first part of Section 304, and the lowest degree under the second part of Section 304. The courts should focus on the key words of Sections 299 and 300.
- The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause thirdly of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death. 'Likely' means probable; 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature' means death is the most probable result. Under clause thirdly, intention to cause death is not necessary, as explained in Virsa Singh.
- A court should approach the question in three stages: whether the accused caused the death; whether the act is culpable homicide under Section 299; and whether it falls within any clause of Section 300 and outside the Exceptions. These are broad guidelines, not cast-iron imperatives.
- Confining the beating to the arms and legs does not take the case out of clause thirdly. 'Bodily injury' includes the plural, so the clause applies where injuries intentionally caused are cumulatively sufficient to cause death, though none is so individually. The High Court's reasoning was erroneous and largely speculative.
- The injuries were intentionally inflicted in a premeditated attack with heavy sticks and were cumulatively sufficient to cause death. Applying Anda v. State of Rajasthan, the offence was murder. The appeal was allowed and the life sentence restored against Accused 2.
Why it matters
The judgment sets out a comparative table of Sections 299 and 300 IPC, explains the three degrees of culpable homicide, and lays down a three-stage approach for deciding whether an offence is murder. Applying Virsa Singh and Anda, it holds that clause thirdly of Section 300 covers injuries that are cumulatively sufficient to cause death, even when the assailants avoided vital parts and an intention to cause death is not proved.
In the Court's words
Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.
“In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not viceversa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not amounting to. murder'.”
“The difference between cl. (b) of s. 299 and cl. (3) of s. 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree.”
“The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in s. 299.”
“The expression "bodily injury" in Clause 3rdly includes also its plural, so that the clause would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally, caused by the accused are cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature, even if none of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency.”
Provisions interpreted
- Section 299, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 100 (NCRB correspondence table)
- Section 300, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 101 (NCRB correspondence table)
- Section 304, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 105 (NCRB correspondence table)
- Section 302, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 103 (NCRB correspondence table)
Related judgments
- Follows Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958)“Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra) even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder.” (page 8)
Case and bench
- Parties
- State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya
- Case
- Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1971
- Decided
- 15 September 1976
- Bench
- Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali
- Opinions
- Unanimous. Judgment of the Court delivered by R.S. Sarkaria, J.
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