Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab

Supreme Court of India · 11 March 1958 · 3 judges · 1958 AIR 465; 1958 SCR 1495

The Court explained what the prosecution must prove under Section 300, clause thirdly, IPC, and upheld the appellant's murder conviction for a single spear thrust into the abdomen that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Facts

Virsa Singh was tried with five others for offences including murder read with Section 149 IPC and was also charged individually under Section 302. There was only one injury on the deceased, Khem Singh, caused by a spear thrust from the appellant into the lower left abdomen; three coils of intestine came out of the wound and he died the next day. The doctor said the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The Sessions Judge thought the appellant did not intend to cause death, but held the case fell under Section 300, thirdly, and convicted him under Section 302. The High Court upheld the conviction and acquitted the others. Special leave was limited to the question of what offence was made out on the findings accepted by the High Court.

Questions before the Court

Whether, under Section 300, thirdly, IPC, the intention must extend to causing an injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or only to causing the particular injury found to be present.
What offence was made out on the findings accepted by the High Court.

What the Court held

The two parts of Section 300, thirdly are disjunctive and separate. The intention required is to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present. Whether that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is an objective inference from the nature of the injury and has nothing to do with intention.
The prosecution must prove: that a bodily injury is present; the nature of the injury; that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is, it was not accidental or unintentional and no other kind of injury was intended; and that the injury so described is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
Once these four elements are proved, the offence is murder under Section 300, thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death, or no knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. The burden is on the prosecution throughout.
The inquiry into intention is broad based and based on common sense, such as whether there was an intention to strike at a vital spot with sufficient force. Once the injury is proved, intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion; whether it existed is a question of fact.
Here no evidence or explanation showed that the appellant did not intend to stab in the stomach with force enough to penetrate so far. It would be perverse to find he did not intend the injury. The conviction under Section 302 was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Why it matters

The judgment sets out a four step test for murder under Section 300, thirdly, IPC. It separates the subjective question (did the accused intend the particular injury found) from the objective question (is that injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death), and rejects the argument that the accused must also intend or know the injury's seriousness. It disapproves the contrary approach in Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan.

In the Court's words

Copied from the official judgment; each passage links to its page.

“To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300, 3rdly " ; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present ; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.”

Vivian Bose, J.Page 4 of the judgment

“Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.”

Vivian Bose, J.Page 5 of the judgment

“No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.”

Vivian Bose, J.Page 5 of the judgment

“The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If be can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved.”

Vivian Bose, J.Page 6 of the judgment

Provisions interpreted

Section 300, clause thirdly, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 101 (NCRB correspondence table)
Section 302, Indian Penal CodeNow: BNS 103 (NCRB correspondence table)

Related judgments

Followed in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976)

Case and bench

Parties: Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab
Case: Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1957
Decided: 11 March 1958
Bench: Vivian Bose, Syed Jaffer Imam, P.B. Gajendragadkar
Opinions: Unanimous. Judgment of the Court delivered by Vivian Bose, J.

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